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POLICING THE BORDER BETWEEN TRADEMARKS
AND FREE SPEECH: PROTECTING UNAUTHORIZED
TRADEMARK USE IN EXPRESSIVE WORKS
Pratheepan Gulasekaram*
Abstract: Artists and other creators of expressive works often include trademarks and
trademarked products as part of their works. They do so for a number of reasons, including
lighthearted humor, critical cultural commentary, parody, or even simply to shock. In
instances where such use is both unauthorized by and perceived as disparaging to the mark
owner or the trademarked product, owners have attempted to sue under trademark law to
enjoin the expressive use. This Article argues that, under a proper analysis of trademark law,
precedent, and the free expression ideal enshrined in the First Amendment, mark owners
should rarely, if ever, prevail in such actions. This Article evaluates the current state of the
law, criticizing its inconsistencies and equivocations, and suggests that the correct analytical
framework for these disputes must protect the public, creative nature of trademarks and their
cultural meaning. The proposed framework mandates balancing of the competing public
interest factors of marketplace confusion and free expression to resolve infringement cases,
with the assumption that this approach will rarely lead to liability for defendants. As for
claims of reputational harm, the free expression concerns compel defendant-friendly results
in all cases. After defending this framework, this Article then scrutinizes the background
legal doctrine framing this debate-the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine-to
discern its relevance to controversies occasioned by unauthorized trademark use. The Article
concludes that as commercialism in artistic works such as feature films increases, the line
between commercial and noncommercial speech will blur and will again force
reconsideration of the border between trademark law and free speech.
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INTRODUCTION
I know what you're thinking. Did he fire six shots or only five?
Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement, I've kinda lost
track myself. But being as this is a .44 Magnum, the most
powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your head clean
off, you've got to ask yourself one question: "Do I feel lucky?"
Well, do ya punk? - Clint Eastwood, as Detective "Dirty"
Harry Callahan.'
Whether people have seen the movie or not, most have heard
variations of these famous lines and know that Clint Eastwood, as Dirty
Harry, carries a Smith & Wesson .44 Magnum.2 This endorsement is
etched in our cultural landscape, like Andy Warhol's works depicting
Campbell's soup cans, E.T.'s taste for Reese's Pieces, and Paul Simon's
hit, "Kodachrome." In Dirty Harry, Eastwood is packing product
placement and testifying to the expressive powers of trademarked
products. In many cases where a trademarked product appears in an
expressive work such as a motion picture, artists actively solicit
cooperation from trademark owners in the hope that they will agree to
such use, pay for the placement, or offer free use of the products in
1. DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Ralph Frammolino & Steve Berry, A Powerful New Revolver Is Already Drawing
Fire, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at Al (discussing Smith & Wesson's newest revolver model,
which uses a .50 caliber bullet).
3. See DIRTY HARRY, supra note 1.
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conjunctive advertising.4 Though much has been written about the
growing use of paid and authorized trademark placement,
5
comparatively little has been written about the use of a trademark or
trademarked product in an expressive work without the trademark
6
owner's permission.
The crux of this Article is that even without permission, those
engaged in noncommercial expression, such as filmmakers, are at liberty
to reference, disparage, ridicule, or otherwise use a trademark or
trademarked product in their expressive work without undue fear of
trademark liability. I arrive at this conclusion by defining the outer
boundary of trademark ownership rights. I identify this boundary by
comparing and contrasting trademark rights to private and public
property, ultimately deciding that the private property rights of
trademark owners must yield to efficient communication about and
creative public uses of such property.
In determining how the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protects the use of a trademark in the absence of the trademark owner's
consent, I attempt to answer two questions. Does the First Amendment
protect the right to use trademarks and trademarked products in
expressive and artistic endeavors without the authorization of trademark
owners? If so, what is the foundation and scope of that right? While
some federal courts have addressed these questions,7 no court has
articulated a comprehensive analytical framework for examining the
4. See, e.g., Michelle Fowler, To Protect and... To Profit: The Trademarking of the LAPD as an
Example of Expanding Intellectual Property Rights, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1623, 1642 (2001) (noting
that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) gave producers of the movie Dragnet permission
to feature an official LAPD badge, and producers subsequently donated several buildings to Los
Angeles); Avi Friedman, Protection of Sports Trademarks, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 689, 689
(1995) (noting that major professional sports teams have created licensing departments to control
use of their trademarks); see also Ride and Prejudice, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 16; Lights,
Camera, Brands, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 61.
5. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); Steven L.
Snyder, Note: Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films Into Commercial
Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301; see also Lights, Camera, Brands, supra note 4, at 61 (noting the
growing prevalence of product placement and noting that the product placement market was worth
$3.5 billion in 2004).
6. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10.22.1
(4th ed. 2002) ("There is a surprising paucity of case law on the legality of the unpermitted use of
commercial trademarks in works of art.").
7. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (protecting
a music group's use of the plaintiff's trademark "Barbie" in a song title); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989) (protecting a filmmaker's use of the plaintiff's name in a movie
title).
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The current uncertainty in the law stems from the muddled judicial
approach employed in some of the first cases that attempt to police the
boundary between trademark law and the First Amendment.8 Cases like
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.9 severely
skewed the analysis by likening trademarks to private real property and
then applying the analysis set forth in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,10 a U.S.
Supreme Court decision that restricted expressive activities on privately
owned shopping centers so long as there were "alternative avenues"
available to the speaker. 1 Not surprisingly, this approach has led to
instances of near-blanket protection for trademark owners by granting
them control over their marks to the same extent that owners of brick-
and-mortar commercial centers control their physical spaces.1 2 As
Professor Robert Denicola has pointed out, some courts have simply
ignored the salient differences between trademarks and private real
property.1 3 In his forward-looking article written in the aftermath of the
8. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting three approaches
to balancing First Amendment interests with trademark law: "(a) the 'likelihood of confusion' test;
(b) the 'alternative avenues' test; and (c) the Rogers v. Grimaldi test."); Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979); Dr. Seuss Enters.
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss 1), 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1571-72 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aft'd,
109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting three approaches to regulation of noncommercial
speech under the Lanham Act: (1) alternative avenues; (2) the balancing test articulated in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); and (3) blanket refusal to apply the Lanham Act to
noncommercial speech).
9. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
10. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
11. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (citing Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567 (holding
that a private shopping center could prohibit the distribution of handbills "where adequate
alternative avenues of communication exist" for the leafletters' speech)). But see Parks, 329 F.3d at
448-49 (noting the "alternative avenues" test as one possible approach, but instead choosing to
apply the Rogers balancing approach); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d
658, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the lower court's reliance on the alternative avenues
approach and remanding the case for reconsideration of scope of injunction); Rogers, 875 F.2d at
1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to enjoin the filmmakers' use of a celebrity's name in movie title);
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (protecting pornographic
magazine publishers' use of the plaintiff's trademarked logo and product line in connection with
pornographic pictures in the magazine).
12. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying the
alternative-avenues test to uphold an injunction against an unauthorized mark user); Brach Van
Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(applying the alternative-avenues test and noting that where the unauthorized use of a trademark
functions to identify the source of the product or message, rather than communicating the message,
trademark law generally prevails over the First Amendment).
13. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
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Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders decision, Professor Denicola argued that
when the ideas expressed by an unauthorized use cause the injury to
plaintiffs mark, the spatial rationale of the "shopping center" cases is
wholly inapplicable.14
Judicial approaches to trademark law that rely on a real property
analogy are flawed because trademarks do more than simply identify the
source of goods and services. Unlike the shopping centers at issue in
Lloyd, trademarks are also part of the lexicon by which we express
significant cultural ideas. As Judge Alex Kozinski elaborated, "[s]ome
trademarks enter our public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary.... Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add
a contemporary flavor to our expressions."' 15 To borrow Professor
Lawrence Lessig's description of certain copyrights, many trademarks
have become part of our "creative commons.' 6 The public utility of
trademarks thus cautions against disregarding a defendant's First
Amendment right to use trademarks as a means of efficient
communication or creative cultural commentary. Furthermore, as with
most cultural commentary, there will often be "alternative avenues" that
could have been used for expression, rendering such a restrictive test
wholly antithetical to First Amendment concerns.
As some courts expressly employed a private real property analysis,
others began wrestling with the inadequacies of this analogy, sometimes
coming to the conclusion that constitutional concerns required
untethering trademark law from the confines of private real property
rights. 17 Accordingly, in cases like L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc.,'8 Rogers v. Grimaldi,19 and Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,2°
Rationales for Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 158, 206.
14. See id. ("If the injury to the plaintiff's trademark arises from the ideas that have been
expressed through the defendant's use, it is no answer to cite the 'shopping center' cases to justify
suppression on the ground that 'adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.' The issue is
not where the defendant may speak, but rather what he must say.") (citations omitted).
15. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
16. See Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MoNT. L. REv. 1, 11 (2004).
17. Compare Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d
Cir. 1979), (relying on First Amendment interpretation in real property cases to protect the
plaintiff's trademark), with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987)
(protecting pornographic magazine publishers' use of plaintiff's trademarked logo and product in
connection with pornographic pictures in magazine).
18. 811 F.2d 26 (lst Cir. 1987).
19. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
20. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
Washington Law Review
courts shied away from the reasoning used in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, choosing instead to emphasize the expressive, public, and
cultural elements of trademarks.2' Unfortunately, despite the availability
of this alternate perspective, some courts have employed, and still
mistakenly employ, rigid private property analyses that fail to account
for broader public interests in free expression.22 Even courts that have
chosen to infuse constitutional concerns into their decision-making have
done so clumsily, leaving much of the boundary between trademark and
free expression undefined.23
The drafters of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA),24 an amendment to the Lanham Act of 1946,25 understood these
competing private and public ideals. While providing for reputational
harm liability-a clear private interest-the FTDA specifically
exempted "noncommercial use" of trademarks from liability,26
essentially providing a statutory basis for free speech protection. The
drafters acknowledged that the statutory exemption was consistent with
existing case law that "recognize[s] that the use of marks in certain
forms of artistic and expressive speech is protected by the First
Amendment., 27 Despite this codification of First Amendment norms,
some courts still evince discomfort with the full import of incorporating
constitutional free expression values into trademark analysis.28
Moreover, even where the statutory exemption protects unauthorized
uses, courts often fail to recognize the constitutionally-mandated nature
of the outcome, instead relying solely on statutory language.29
21. See id. at 906-07 (protecting a music group's use of plaintiff's trademark in song and song
title that made fun of the cultural values represented by the plaintiff's trademarked product); Rogers,
875 F.2d at 1000-02 (refusing to enjoin the filmmakers' use of a celebrity's name in a movie title);
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32 (protecting a pornographic magazine publisher's use of the plaintiff's
trademarked logo and product in connection with pornographic pictures in the magazine).
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. Federal Trade Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (2000)).
25. Id. §§ 1051-1141.
26. See id. § 11 25(c)(4)(B).
27. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 141 CONG.
REC. S19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)).
28. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1996)
(noting uncertainty as to whether all unauthorized expressive uses are exempt from dilution liability
under New York's anti-dilution statute). But see MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 907 (applying FTDA
noncommercial exemption for unauthorized expressive uses).
29. See, e.g., Hormel, 73 F.3d at 508 (holding that there is no likelihood of dilution based on: (1)
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I argue that when assessing trademark owners' claims of unauthorized
mark use in an artistic or expressive context, courts should find the
sensible middle ground between purely private and purely public
concerns. The combination of the Rogers test in infringement claims and
the full consideration of First Amendment norms in dilution claims
ensures creativity and efficiency for the public while maintaining
property rights and incentives for trademark owners.30 In infringement
claims, the parameters of trademark law and free expression are best
assessed by the Rogers framework, which balances the public interest in
protecting the use of trademarks as a source-identifier with the public
interest in free speech.31 Although the Rogers court limited its analysis
to trademark infringement under narrowly confined factual
circumstances, 32 the analysis can and should be used to define the
boundaries of trademark law whenever consumer confusion is at issue.
In the dilution context, where reputational harm is mostly at issue and
consumer confusion is not, unauthorized expressive use falls clearly into
the realm of public control.33 The "noncommercial use" exception to the
FTDA is a legislative recognition of this boundary.34
The use of trademarks to convey expressive ideas is entitled to robust
First Amendment protection that may only be trumped in clear instances
when the use significantly impairs the source-identifying function of the
mark-i.e., only when the likelihood of consumer confusion is high and
market fraud is a genuine danger.35 As those instances are rare in
expressive activity, artists and others are entitled to broad leeway in
using, ridiculing, commenting on, or displaying any trademarked
the lack of evidence that unauthorized use will cause negative associations, (2) the defendant's
status as a non-competitor, and (3) the parody element of the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs
mark). But see MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (noting that the FTDA statutory exemption was
created in part to allay First Amendment concerns).
30. This Article addresses infringement claims and dilution claims under both federal and state
law. State and federal infringement claims both focus on whether the unauthorized use of a mark
creates a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the origin or endorsement of the thing that bears
the unauthorized mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 14320(a) (West 2005). A critical difference between state and federal dilution claims is that the
latter has a statutory exemption for noncommercial use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
31. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
32. Id. ("In the context of titles, this 'no alternative' standard provides insufficient leeway for
literary expression.").
33. See infra Part II.
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(b).
35. See infra Part III (focusing on examples of potential liability under this proposed standard).
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products. A mark owner's argument that a defendant's idea or
unauthorized use in an expressive context confuses consumers or sullies
a plaintiffs reputation should not survive motions for dismissal or
summary judgment. Under my proposed use of the Rogers test in
infringement claims and a recognition of First Amendment concerns in
dilution claims, artists and other expressive users will access the entirety
of their expressive freedom.
Finally, I show that instead of attempting to impose trademark-
dilution liability on artists who use or denigrate others' marks without
permission, trademark owners would be better served by challenging the
U.S. Supreme Court's current distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech.36 The analysis presented here should lead mark
owners to the realization that, properly defined, trademark law cannot
and should not in most cases redress harm from expressive uses, despite
any unwholesomeness of that use. For mark owners and for courts, the
more critical question is whether a particular use is in fact an expressive
or artistic use or whether it is a commercial use that could be subject to
greater trademark law liability. It is this distinction-and not the
difference between a wholesome and damaging portrayal-that
ultimately matters for imposition of dilution liability. While the
designation of speech as commercial or noncommercial does not directly
impact the analysis of infringement claims,37 it indirectly impacts those
claims in a number of ways explored in further detail below. Primarily, it
alters the weight and import of the factors courts consider in the
infringement analysis.38 In contrast to the commercial context where
public confusion concerns are measured against private economic
interests, in the noncommercial context, the public confusion concern is
measured against an equally weighty public free expression concern.39 In
addition, the designation between the two types of speech inherently
impacts the relevance of the individual factors considered in
infringement analyses, making certain factors practically dispositive in
those cases.4°
36. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-72 (1983) (evaluating
whether an advertisement that commented on public health was commercial or noncommercial
speech and holding that it was commercial speech).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (omitting express exemption for noncommercial uses).
38. See infra Part III for discussion regarding saliency of infringement factors in the context of
expressive works.
39. See infra Part I.C.
40. See infra Parts III & IV.B-.C.
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Part I examines the competing judicial approaches to trademark
claims in expressive works. Part II explores the deficiencies in the
current, prevailing judicial treatment of such claims. Part III offers a
defense of the proposed analytical methodology. Finally, Part IV argues
that the boundary between trademark and free speech established by the
proposed methodology will shift only if the U.S. Supreme Court
reconsiders its commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy. Using
product placement in movies as an example, this Article considers how
expanding the definition of commercial speech will shift the
trademark/free speech analysis towards greater consideration of private
property concerns.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Trademark law addressing infringement and dilution is based on both
a vibrant statutory framework and a muddled array of precedents from
various federal courts. This Article first explains the present statutory
framework. It then outlines early judicial attempts to address the issue of
unauthorized expressive uses and the evolution of that analysis.
A. Current Statutory Framework
As a subset of unfair competition laws in general, 4 the Lanham Act
provides causes of action against persons who (1) use trademarks in a
manner that is likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of their goods by another person42 or (2) misrepresent the
source of the trademarked product or service in commercial
advertising.43 The underlying tenet of the Lanham Act is consumer
protection, stemming from a desire to prevent companies from
misleading consumers into using products or services by infringing upon
other companies' more popular or more highly regarded trademarks.4
The motivation to protect consumers is a strong theme throughout the
trademark-infringement provisions of the Lanham Act, 45 which evinces a
design to protect public interests to the same extent as, if not more than,
41. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (noting unfair
competition's origins in English common law, later codified in the Lanham Act).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing a cause of action for a confusion claim).
43. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (providing a cause of action for a misrepresentation claim).
44. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428.
45. See id.; Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
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competing commercial interests.46
To state a trademark infringement claim based on confusion, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's use of its trademark is likely to
cause consumers to believe that the plaintiff endorsed, manufactured,
sponsored, or was otherwise affiliated with the defendant's confusingly
similar product.47 The U.S. Courts of Appeals have employed various
multi-factored tests to determine likelihood of confusion, generally
focusing on the following concerns: (1) the strength of plaintiff's
trademark; (2) the similarity of plaintiffs and defendant's trademarks;
(3) the proximity of plaintiff's and defendant's products; (4) the
likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap between its products and
defendant's products; (5) the actual or potential likelihood for confusion;
(6) the defendant's intent to confuse the public;48 (7) the quality of
defendant's product; and (8) the sophistication of consumers.49 In the
specific context of expressive uses, not all of these factors are always
relevant to the court, and some may take on greater significance in those
uses compared to their significance in commercial uses.5°
In 1995, Congress added a federal cause of action for dilution claims
when it passed the FTDA as an amendment to the Lanham Act. 51 Before
enactment of the FTDA, trademark owners possessed only federal
causes of action for infringement, and were relegated to relying on state
laws for dilution claims.52 Claims based on dilution, unlike claims based
46. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1129 (requiring willful infringement for damages and providing
exemptions for noncommercial, newsworthy, and fair use expressions); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428-
29 (noting that "[i]nfringement law protects consumers from being misled by the use of infringing
marks" and "[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark
dilution ... are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers").
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A).
48. This factor focuses on intent to confuse, not intent to disparage. Many unauthorized users
intend to disparage products, but do not intend to confuse consumers. See, e.g., Mattel, 296 F.3d at
900 (protecting the defendant's song that poked fun at the plaintiff's trademarked "Barbie" doll,
where the defendant was not attempting to sell competitive dolls or confuse consumers as to the
plaintiff's endorsement of the song).
49. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729, 731 (1938)) (identifying factors used when products are
related but not competitive); Polaroid, Inc. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729, 730, 731 (1938)) (identifying factors used when
products are different).
50. See infra Part III for discussion regarding the saliency of infringement factors in the context
of expressive works.
51. See Federal Trade Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
52. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003) (noting that at least
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on infringement that allege confusion or misrepresentation, assert either
blurring or tarnishment of the trademark.53 Blurring occurs when a
distinct mark loses its ability to identify the product that made the mark
famous (e.g., "Buick Aspirin" or "Du Pont Shoes").54 Tamishment
occurs when use of the mark in certain contexts causes negative
associations with the mark.55 The FTDA for the most part reflects the
wisdom of the various state anti-dilution statutes that were in existence
for decades before the FTDA was created.
56
To state a federal dilution claim a plaintiff must show that: (1) its
trademark is famous; (2) the defendant put the mark to use after the
plaintiffs mark became famous; (3) the defendant put the mark to
commercial use in commerce; and (4) actual dilution occurred.57
Following a court's determination that the plaintiff satisfies these four
prongs, the court must then consider whether the dilutive use
nevertheless falls into an enumerated exemption in the FTDA.58 The
most significant of those exemptions, for purposes of artistic and
expressive works, is the "noncommercial use" exemption codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(4)(B).59 If the defendant's use is noncommercial-as
most, if not all, expressive uses are-it is wholly exempt from dilution
liability under the FTDA.6°
twenty-five states had anti-dilution statutes before the FTDA was enacted).
53. Id.
54. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24:68.
55. See id. § 24:69.
56. Courts have noted that the elements of state dilution claims are similar to the elements of a
federal dilution claim. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.
1998) (noting that California's anti-dilution statute is similar to the FTDA and subject to the same
analysis). But see Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33 (noting that "[tihe contrast between the state [anti-
dilution] statutes and the federal [dilution] statute" is that the federal dilution statute
"unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution rather than a likelihood of dilution").
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (requiring a showing of actual
dilution, and not simply a likelihood of dilution, before a plaintiff can prevail on either a blurring or
tamishment theory under the FTDA).
58. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434; Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir.
2002) (determining first that the song title would satisfy dilution factors and then holding that it
nevertheless satisfied the noncommercial use exemption).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) ("(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled.. .to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name .... (4) The
following shall not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another
person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark. (C) All forms of news
reporting and news commentary.").
60. See id. The "noncommercial use" exemption, id. § 1125(c)(4)(B), and the "commercial use in
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Although state anti-dilution statutes generally differ from the FTDA
in two major ways, these differences are inconsequential for this
analysis. First, state anti-dilution statutes do not require "actual dilution"
but rather a likelihood of dilution.61 The actual dilution standard,
however, only presents a difference in standards of proof for federal
claims as opposed to state claims; it does not represent a different
theoretical orientation to the proper scope of the First Amendment's
protection of unauthorized expressive use. 62 Second, state anti-dilution
statutes do not contain an exemption for noncommercial use.63 Similarly,
this absence should not affect my analysis. If my contention is correct,
then whether the cases deal with the FTDA's express exemption or with
state anti-dilution laws, the First Amendment would control, creating a
fundamental norm that cannot be abridged by federal or state statute or
lack thereof.64 In this sense, the FTDA's statutory exemption, while
helpful and clear, is superfluous: it protects what is already protected.65
With federal or state claims based on either confusion or dilution, the
rights of trademark owners often clash with the First Amendment rights
of artists, publishers, and commentators. Such clashes often occur in the
context of books, magazines, news reporting, consumer reviews, critical
commerce" element, id. § 1125(c)(1), are not in conflict with each other. The commercial use-in-
commerce language refers to Congress's intent to legislate to the extent of its authority, not a
substantive limit on Lanham Act causes of action. See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112
F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am.
N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark in a song was a
"commercial use in commerce" because the defendants sold the song containing the mark to
consumers in the marketplace); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900
(N.D. Cal. 2002) ("An expressive use is not rendered commercial by the impact of the use on
sales."). A mark's use is "commercial" in the FTDA exemption or First Amendment sense only if it
is within the definitional bounds of the U.S. Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. See
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (defining commercial speech as that
which "does no more than propose a commercial transaction") (citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1.7722, at *40-41 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (noting that Georgia's anti-dilution statute requires only
a likelihood of dilution).
62. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24:95 (confirming that actual dilution represents a quantum-
of-proof difference from likelihood-of-dilution standard).
63. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14320(a) (West 2005).
64. See Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (citing Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g
Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he same First Amendment considerations that
limit a cause of action under the Lanham Act apply also to a cause of action under New York
law.")).
65. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29,
1995)).
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commentaries, paintings, motion pictures, parodies, and other forms of
protected expression.66 In the dilution context, this expressive activity is
at least partially shielded from liability under the FTDA.6 7 In contrast, in
state dilution claims and all confusion claims, this expressive activity is
protected only so far as the courts choose to recognize First Amendment
concerns.
68
B. Misguided Beginnings to the Analysis of Trademark Claims in the
Context of Expressive Works
In a number of prominent cases, including Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc.,6 9 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, and Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Productions, Inc.,7° courts have ruled in favor of mark owners,
agreeing that their property rights in their marks included the ability to
enjoin disparaging uses of their marks in expressive contexts under
federal trademark and state competition law. 71  These misguided
beginnings still occasionally haunt jurisprudence in this area, causing
courts to unnecessarily harmonize their existence rather than simply
discarding them as outdated and incorrect law.72 More importantly, these
66. See e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving a conflict
between a filmmaker's free-expression rights and the plaintiffs trademark rights in her famous
name).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
68. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14320(a) (providing no express statutory exemption or
accommodation of First Amendment concerns); Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
69. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
70. No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981). Reaching a similar
result as the Coca-Cola and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders courts, the Pillsbury court enjoined
depiction of Pillsbury's "Poppin' Fresh" character by defendant in a pornographic magazine. See id.
at *40-41. Although the court concluded that the trademark owner could not show sufficient
likelihood of confusion to merit an injunction on its infringement claim, see id. at *37-38, the court
expressly concluded that relief was appropriate based on plaintiff's tarnishment claim under
Georgia anti-dilution statutes, see id. at *40-41. The court held that First Amendment concerns
were not sufficient to prevail over the likelihood of damage to plaintiffs business reputation from
the defendant's placement of plaintiffs mark in a "depraved context." See id. at *39.
71. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming order of preliminary injunction on confusion claim); Pillsbury, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17722, at *40-41 (granting injunctive relief on dilution claim); Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at
1193 (granting motion for preliminary injunction on infringement and dilution claims).
72. For example, after Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, courts in the Second Circuit stretched to
distinguish their cases from this case. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (2d
Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as a case involving "blatantly false
advertising"); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(distinguishing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as a case that involved a defendant pornographer
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initial cases anchored trademark law in a private real property analysis
from which it is just recently attempting to break free.
Coca-Cola, an early decision by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, rooted its analysis in a desire to provide
absolute protection to the plaintiff mark-owner from reputational harm.73
This case involved a poster company's use of the familiar and
trademarked Coca-Cola bottle outline with the words "Enjoy Cocaine"
written in Coca-Cola's distinctive script.74 The district court issued a
preliminary injunction against the defendant from manufacturing
defendant's posters, noting that the defendant (1) associated "a noxious
substance" with plaintiffs "wholesome beverage," and (2) caused actual
confusion in the marketplace.75 The court granted the injunction based
on its assessment that Coca-Cola was likely to prevail on both its
likelihood-of-confusion claim under the Lanham Act and its dilution
76claim under state law. The court refused to recognize defendant's First
Amendment defense, opining that damage to a mark and to the mark
owner's goodwill and business reputation was a special circumstance in
which the court may enjoin or restrain expressive material.77 To the
extent that a court bases its decision to reject a First Amendment defense
on reputational damage instead of consumer confusion, the Coca-Cola
decision is emblematic of judicial decision-making that strikes the
wrong balance between private and public interests.
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the Second Circuit similarly relied
on a real property analogy and enjoined the distribution and exhibition
of the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas.78 In film and print
advertisements, defendants featured the lead actress wearing a costume
competing with a sports franchise in the same "national entertainment market").
73. See Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1188-89 (reasoning that "[p]laintiff's property right in its
mark clearly extends to its reproduction and publication in advertising and for other promotional
uses regarding its products" and that "[t]o associate such a noxious substance as cocaine with
plaintiff's wholesome beverage ... would clearly have a tendency to impugn that product and injure
plaintiff's business reputation ... .
74. Id. at 1186.
75. Id. at 1188-89 & n.5 (noting that customers had actually written to Coca-Cola, demanding an
explanation as to why the soft-drink company was promoting illegal drug use).
76. See id. at 1191-93.
77. See id. at 1192-93 (rejecting the defendant's argument that "in the absence of special
circumstances a court of equity will not enjoin or restrain literary or spoken material") (internal
quotations omitted).
78. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.
1979).
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strikingly similar to the trademarked outfits worn by the actual Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders.7 9 The court, analyzing the plaintiffs confusion
claim under the Lanham Act and New York state anti-dilution law,
reasoned that because the advertisements could lead the public to believe
that the film involved an ex-Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader, the possibility
existed that the public would think the film was a publicity move by the
actual Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders. 80 However, as many commentators
have noted,8' underlying the court's decision appears to be a belief that
the film's content was "gross and revolting." 82 The defendant filmmaker
argued that his movie explored the concept of sexuality in sports and
was therefore protected speech not amenable to trademark liability.83 In
rejecting the filmmaker's First Amendment defense, the court invoked a
real property analogy-relying on Lloyd, where handbill leafletters were
denied a First Amendment right to distribute handbills on private
commercial real estate84 to conclude that because the filmmaker could
have made his statement about sexuality in sports using "alternative
avenues" that did not violate property rights, the unauthorized use was
not protected speech.85
C. Untethering Trademark and Real Property: The Uneasy
Emergence of Constitutional Consideration
In subsequent cases, courts began to reject the concept of trademarks
as private property and embrace the idea of trademarks as vehicles of
public expression that are concurrently public and private.86 Professor
Denicola's critique took specific aim at the uncomplicated and deficient
analysis in Coca-Cola, arguing that "the court's statement in Coca-Cola
[rejecting consideration of First Amendment rights] bespeaks a kind of
79. See id. at 205.
80. See id. at 205 & n.8.
81. See, e.g., Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 131, 148-53 (1989); Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech:
Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 23
(1991).
82. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 202.
83. Id. at 206.
84. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972).
85. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (citing Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567).
86. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (lst Cir. 1987)
(recognizing the importance of First Amendment principles in protecting a defendant magazine-
publisher's use of plaintiff's trademark in a pornographic magazine).
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absolutism hardly in keeping with modem [F]irst [A]mendment
theory. 87 So, too, with Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders: "[T]he sweeping
rejection of the defendant's [F]irst [A]mendment claim in Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders is dangerously simplistic. 88
The L.L. Bean court embraced this rationale and eschewed the easy
resolution of the free speech issue employed by the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders court. 89 The L.L. Bean court, in its assessment of a
pornographic magazine's sex-oriented parody of plaintiffs trademarked
school-supply products, acknowledged this competing perspective and
refused to equate the rights of a trademark owner with the rights of a
real-property owner.90 In dismissing the plaintiffs state law dilution
claims, the court reasoned that the pornographic magazine was not using
the plaintiffs mark for a "commercial" purpose, but rather for parody
and artistic purposes.91 As such, the court refused to allow the trademark
owner to control all public discourse on its trademarked products.92
The marquee moment for the emerging constitutional consideration in
trademark law arrived with Rogers, where the Second Circuit
determined that director Federico Fellini's movie title, Ginger & Fred,
did not violate actress Ginger Rogers's trademark rights in her name
under the federal infringement statute. 93 The Rogers court reasoned that
the proper analysis for confusion claims under the Lanham Act should
account for the interests protected by both trademark infringement laws
and the Constitution.94 To do so, the court employed a balancing test for
the movie title at issue, assessing trademark liability by considering
whether the public interest in avoiding confusion outweighed the public
interest in free expression. 95 Employing the Second Circuit's multi-
factored likelihood-of-confusion test, the court determined that use of
Rogers's name in the title might create some confusion as to source or
87. Denicola, supra note 13, at 205.
88. Id. at 206.
89. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29 (rejecting plaintiff's tarnishment claim under Maine dilution
law).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 32.
92. See id. at 31 ("Neither the strictures of the First Amendment nor the history and theory of
anti-dilution law permit a finding of tarnishment based solely on the presence of an unwholesome or
negative context in which a trademark is used without authorization. Such a reading of the anti-
dilution statute unhinges it from its origins in the marketplace.").
93. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. Id. at 999.
95. Id.
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affiliation.96 The court ruled, however, that when the title of the
expressive work bears artistic relevance to the underlying artistic work,
"some" confusion is legally acceptable and therefore insufficient to state
an infringement claim.97 The court's focus on the "noncommercial"
nature of the use foreshadowed the distinction that, I argue, is critical in
assessing both infringement and dilution claims.
The balancing test articulated by the Rogers court is compelling
because it is the only approach attuned to the primary purpose of
trademark laws: protecting the public against confusion and fraud.98 The
innovation of the Rogers court is not its employment of flexible
balancing per se, but rather its choice of the two interests considered in
the balance. Both interests on the scale are public: (1) the public interest
in avoiding confusion; and (2) the public interest in free speech. 99 The
underlying message is unmistakable: in the context of expressive works,
private property interests in trademark are protected only to the extent
they coincide with the public's interest in avoiding confusion and fraud.
By de-emphasizing consideration of private interests in its balancing
test, the Rogers court recognized a famous trademark's tremendous
cultural and communicative value, which in expressive use transcends a
trademark's value solely as a source-identifier.
Since Rogers, decisions in this area of law have vacillated between
the competing values of private property and public concern.' °° Courts'
attempts to navigate between these two poles have led to confused and
96. Id. at 1000-01.
97. See id. at 1001 ("To the extent that there is a risk that the title will mislead some consumers as
to what the work is about, that risk is outweighed by the danger that suppressing an artistically
relevant though ambiguous title will unduly restrict expression.").
98. With respect to FTDA claims, the result of the Rogers balancing test is preordained because
the noncommercial exception will always tilt the scale to the public's interest in free speech. Even
though the primary purpose of the FTDA is to protect mark owners' property interests, and not to
protect consumers against confusion like the Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000)
(providing civil remedy to a plaintiff trademark-owner); id. § 1125(c)(4) (exempting public uses in
expression and media from liability), I argue that trademark law applied to expression is correctly
understood only when it considers public concerns.
99. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (noting that the Lanham Act should be applied to artistic works
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The public has
at least as much interest in the free exchange of ideas as it does in avoiding misleading
advertising.").
100. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507-08 (2d Cir.
1996) (protecting a filmmaker's use of the plaintiff's trademark as a humorous character in a
movie); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987) (enjoining a shirt
designer's use of the plaintiff's trademark on a t-shirt design).
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inconsistent analyses.' 10 For example, even as the Second and Ninth
Circuits forged ahead with more nuanced, artist-friendly decisions in
cases like Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,102 Dr.
Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,103 and MCA
Records,'°4 the Eighth Circuit's tandem of Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co. v. Novak'0 5 and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications10 6
101. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507-08 (2d Cir.
1996); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987). see also Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1571 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
102. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). The court rejected the plaintiffs confusion and dilution claims
that its trademark for Spam, a pork product, was infringed by the defendant's depiction of a wild-
boar Muppet named Spa'am. Id. at 505-06. Although the court did not expressly employ the Rogers
test, it noted that the confusion claim failed at district court because children, understanding the
Muppets' unique brand of humor, would not be confused into thinking that Hormel had sponsored
the film or was otherwise affiliated with the Muppets. Id. at 502. With regard to the state dilution
claim, the court did not expressly address First Amendment concerns. See id. at 505-08. In rejecting
Hormel's dilution claim, the court reasoned that under a tamishment theory, Henson, the Muppets,
and the movies in which they appeared were not competitors with Hormel for sale of meat products.
Id. at 507-08. Tamishment claims, the court noted, were successful in cases involving sexuality,
obscenity, and illegal activity. Id. at 507.
103. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). The court found
that the plaintiffs trademark claim did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits. Id. at 1571. The plaintiff sued the defendant for using the familiar Dr. Seuss style of
storytelling to recount the O.J. Simpson double-homicide trial. Id. Concluding that the plaintiff had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the copyright claim, the court enjoined the
defendant's publication and sale of its book. See id. at 1562. In evaluating the plaintiffs trademark
claims, however, the court found that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits of its infringement claim, id. at 1571, and that the FTDA did not provide a basis for
liability for a parody that is merely amusing, not confusing, id. at 1574.
104. 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The court rejected the plaintiffs confusion and dilution
claims. Id. at 907. Mattel, owner of the world-renowned Barbie trademark identifying its distinctive
line of dolls, sued a music band for its use of the name "Barbie" in their song "Barbie Girl," which,
in its lyrics, mocks Barbie and the mores the doll represents. Id. at 899. With regard to Mattel's
confusion-infringement claim, the court endorsed the Rogers balancing test, persuaded that the title
"Barbie Girl" was relevant to defendants' commentary on the trademarked product. Id. at 902.
Applying the Rogers test, the court balanced the competing public interests, finding that the free-
speech concerns far outweighed the possibility of public confusion, if any, engendered by the song
title. See id. Noting that the Barbie trademark had been imbued with a "meaning beyond its source-
identifying function," the court refused to allow any private property interests of the trademark
owner to outweigh the public interest in free expression. Id. at 900. On the FTDA claim, the court
held that although the use of the mark was dilutive, the use was exempted from dilution liability
because it fell within the noncommercial use exemption to the FTDA. Id. at 906-07.
105. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). The court enjoined the defendant's satirical "Mutant of
Omaha" merchandise, featuring a shrunken "Indian Head" and the caption "Nuclear Holocaust
Insurance" as a confusion infringement of Mutual of Omaha's "Indian Head" trademark. Id. at 403.
The court first concluded that under the Eighth Circuit's infringement analysis, the defendant's
reference to the plaintiffs trademark was likely to confuse consumers as to source and affiliation.
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harkened back to the restrictive real property constrictions of prior case
law. 10 7 Artist-friendly decisions like MCA Records properly invoked the
Rogers test, but improperly limited the situations in which the Rogers
test should apply.10 8 Such indefensible limitations on the reach of free
expression concerns have caused further analytical quandaries for courts
assessing trademark claims.'0 9
The passage of the FTDA in 1995, despite foreshadowing a judicial
commitment to greater free expression consideration, has not curtailed
the stunted incorporation of First Amendment concerns."0 The FTDA
created a federal cause of action for dilution while simultaneously
codifying a First Amendment defense for expressive uses of trademarks
Id. Second, the court employed a private real property analysis, citing Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders for the proposition that trademark law does not have to yield to the First Amendment
where alternate avenues of expression exist for the defendant. Id. at 402. Because the defendant
could have presented his editorial parody in a book, magazine, or film, the injunction did not
infringe upon constitutional rights. See id. at 402. The court did not address the state disparagement
claim because it would not have affected the remedy. See id. at 398 n.2.
106. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). The court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's infringement
and dilution claims based on the defendant's mockery of the plaintiffs advertising slogans. Id. at
779. The court ruled for the plaintiff even though the defendant's chosen avenue for expression-a
humor magazine-was one of the "avenues" deemed acceptable for expression by the Mutual of
Omaha court. See id. at 775-76. In Balducci, the court first found that the defendant's parody ad
created a likelihood of confusion under the Eighth Circuit's multi-factored infringement test. Id. at
775. In the second part of its analysis, the court nominally applied the Rogers balancing test to
determine if the First Amendment nevertheless protected the defendant's confusing use. Id. at 776.
Yet in applying the test, the court noted that the confusion created by defendant's ad "might have to
be tolerated if even plausibly necessary to achieve the desired commentary .... In this case, the
confusion is wholly unnecessary to Balducci's stated purpose.... Balducci could have conveyed its
message with substantially less risk of consumer confusion." Id. The court noted that Balducci
could have substantially reduced the risk of consumer confusion created by the parody ad by adding
an obvious disclaimer or altering the protected marks in a meaningful way so that consumers would
not be confused. Id. By evaluating the necessity vel non of the ad, the court essentially used a
private real property analogy to dispose of the defendant's First Amendment protections. In effect,
the court employed the alternative-avenues test under the guise of the balancing test.
107. At least in part, these disparate analytical paradigms can be attributed to chronology.
Hormel, Dr. Seuss, and MCA Records were all decided contemporaneously with, or subsequent to,
the passage of the FTDA, whereas both Mutual of Omaha and Balducci pre-dated the Act. Notably,
in both Dr. Seuss and MCA Records, the courts considered claims under the FTDA, but expressly
rejected those claims. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902-06; Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1573-74.
108. See, e.g., MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902 (applying the Rogers standard for literary titles to
song titles).
109. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808 (9th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting plaintiff's trademark claims, but failing to extend the MCA Records standard beyond
titles).
110. See, e.g., id. (rejecting plaintiff's trademark claims, but reluctant to apply the FTDA
exemption to a body of artistic work, and instead only applying FTDA exemption to title of work).
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against those newly-minted federal dilution claims. 11' The legislative
record of the FTDA reflects a general desire to protect artistic and
expressive works and specifically account for constitutional concerns.' 12
Still, such legislative considerations did not correct the irreconcilable
paradigms advanced in differently decided cases. First, the FTDA's
codification only related to dilution claims (blurring and tarnishment),
and not infringement claims. 1 3 The disparate rulings on infringement
continued after the FTDA's enactment.' 1 4 Second, passage of the FTDA
did not specifically overrule any cases relying on private, real property
constrictions. Ostensibly, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Coca-Cola,
Pillsbury, Balducci, and Mutual of Omaha remain good law and are still
cited in support of federal court decisions. 15
The next section details the flaws produced by courts' vacillation
between the perceived polarities and their improper incorporation of free
expression concerns. I will then discuss a potential solution to these
problems. Finally, I apply that solution to the ripening conflicts between
trademark and free expression.
II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT ANALYSIS
As it currently stands, the existing case law suffers from three distinct
flaws. First, trademark cases misconceive the limits of real property
rights. Thus, advocates of the trademark protection apparent in cases like
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c)(4)(B) (2000); MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 ("The FTDA's
section-by-section analysis presented in the House and Senate suggests that the bill's sponsors relied
on the 'noncommercial use' exemption to allay First Amendment concerns.") (citing H.R. REP. No.
104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035; 141 CONG. REC. S19311 (daily
ed. Dec. 29, 1995)).
112. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 ("The FTDA's section-by-section analysis presented in
the House and Senate suggests that the bill's sponsors relied on the 'noncommercial use' exemption
to allay First Amendment concerns.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035; 141 CONG. REC. S19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)).
113. See 15U.S.C.§ 1125.
114. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 109 F:3d 1394,
1403-06 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing, with approval, Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905,
910 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987)) (enjoining the defendant book publisher's
use of the plaintiffs trademarked style in a humor book); see also Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New
Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998) (citing Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, and noting that the Eighth Circuit has allowed injunctive relief "even when the
enjoined material included some expressive content") (enjoining the filmmaker's use of the
plaintiffs trademark in movie regarding obesity in the Midwest).
115. See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 731-34; Dr. Seuss 1, 924 F. Supp at 1570-75;
see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders perversely argue for property protection
that exceeds actual private real property rights. Second, unprincipled
equivocation between real property and free speech poles has forced
courts to create untenable subject-matter- and genre-based
classifications. These category-based rationales, which are
fundamentally no more than judicially-imposed values, have led to
inconsistent results that render the jurisprudence unworkable, unusable,
and inefficient. Third, the deadweight of irreconcilable precedent has
forced courts to employ unnecessary legal doctrines, appropriate only for
commercial uses, to expressive work. The doctrinal and factual
limitations placed on the few cases that have successfully incorporated
constitutional concerns have served to complicate and re-endanger the
ability to create cultural commentary through unauthorized trademark
use.
These weaknesses highlight the need for a simplified standard that
sensibly defines the boundary between trademark rights and free
expression. Further, they obscure the more pressing and consequential
questions regarding application of the U.S. Supreme Court's commercial
speech doctrine. I address these two issues in Parts III and IV below, and
provide in this Part a full explanation of the identified deficits in the
current analysis.
A. The Proper Private Real Property Analogy
Even if it were proper for courts to address unauthorized expressive
uses by comparison to private real property, trademark owners should
still be denied monopoly-control over their marks. Private property,
especially private real property, coexists with, and sometimes yields to,
public use and concern. 1 6 The framers of the U.S. Constitution
embedded this concept in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause."
7
Judge Kozinski has explained this symbiotic relationship in more detail:
"[p]rivate land... is far more useful if separated from other private land
by public streets, roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-of-way
and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands, but vastly
enhance the value of the property that remains."'
' 18
116. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), denying reh'g to 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en
banc, thereby upholding a game show host's common-law right-of-publicity action against an
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Because incursions into private property for public purposes are
necessary and productive, limiting the reach of trademark law vis-A-vis
expressive works does not degrade or curtail trademark rights, but
clarifies these rights. The extent of trademark law, even when conceived
as private real property, should not reach so far as to preclude free use of
trademarks to promote cultural creativity and efficiently communicate
ideas. In addition to diffuse cultural and public benefits from
unauthorized public use, the public use of marks, in many cases,
enhances the trademark owner's value by reinforcing associations and
strengthening the popularity of the trademarked product." 9
In the arena of commercial competition, rigorous trademark
protection furthers incentives to create. 20  Confirming this point,
Professors William Landes and Richard Posner have suggested that
without such protection the plaintiff trademark-owner would have "less
incentive either to develop a strong trademark or to produce a high-
quality good."1 21 When applied to non-competitors, however, that
protection stifles criticism and commentary and over-deters artistic
choices. Overprotection of trademark rights against non-competitive
expressive uses can be just as harmful as underprotection because it
represses the purpose of trademark law: to foster incentives to create.1 22
This remains true even where the mark owner perceives no immediate
direct benefit from the unauthorized public use or believes that the
concentrated commercial losses of the unauthorized use outweigh
diffuse societal gains.
While a competitor's free-ride on plaintiffs mark could dull
incentives to produce strong marks and high-quality goods, it is not clear
that an expressive, non-competitive use would do so. For instance, the
song "Barbie Girl" will not directly diminish Mattel's share of the
plastic doll market because the song does not compete with Mattel for
sales of its Barbie plastic dolls. 23 Similarly, the sale of a "Mutant of
advertisement referencing her image without her consent.
119. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)
(reasoning that Henson's use of a Muppet named Spa'am was likely to increase identification of
Hormel's Spam pork product with Hormel).
120. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.
L. & ECON. 265, 303 (1987).
121. Id.
122. See White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Overprotection [of intellectual
property] stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.") (citations omitted).
123. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
song title "does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work" nor "explicitly or otherwise,
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Omaha" t-shirt will not reduce incentives for Mutual of Omaha to
provide quality insurance services and develop a trademark to identify
its insurance sales business.124 Mattel's and Mutual of Omaha's loss of
incentives to aggressively market their trademarks and produce high-
quality products is minimal at most.
Moreover, even if expressive noncommercial uses would reduce a
plaintiffs incentives in the same way competitive uses would, the
potential societal costs of deterring free speech would more than
outweigh the cost of dulled incentives to private trademark owners.
125
Because of the fundamental importance of free expression and its
contribution to a "vibrant cultural commons,"'126 trademark owners must
tolerate and subsidize minimal levels of confusion and reputational harm
to their private property. The ostensibly mindless Garbage Pail Kids
trading cards may have to be tolerated so that biting commentaries on
the cultural mores represented by the Barbie doll are not stifled.' 27 As
the Fourth Circuit explained, it is important that trademarks not be
transformed from rights against unfair competition to rights to
control language .... Such a transformation would diminish our
ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of
companies that may be of widespread public concern and
importance.... Much useful social and commercial discourse
would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an
infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a
person, company or product by using its trademark.
28
A conception of private property that ignores these ever-present
necessities of public use and accommodation is inaccurate. Thus,
suggest that it was produced by Mattel").
124. See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) ("There is not a whit of evidence that either Mutual's sales or its image suffered to any
degree .... ").
125. Cf. White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Intellectual property rights aren't
free: They're imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.").
126. See Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REv. 763, 768 (2003).
127. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902 (upholding judgment in favor of defendant's use of
plaintiff's mark "Barbie" to comment on the values that defendant claimed Barbie represents). But
see Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1032,
1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (issuing preliminary injunction against the defendant-humorist's Garbage Pail
Kids trading cards/stickers that pictured, in reference to the plaintiff's Cabbage Patch Kids children
dolls, the Garbage Pail Kids vomiting, making obscene gestures, and acting rudely).
128. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
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trademark case law that employs this comparison without understanding
its limits fails to identify the proper boundary between trademark and
free expression.
B. Untenable Subject-Matter- and Genre-Based Distinctions
Despite the First Amendment and the codification of its norms into
the FTDA exemption for noncommercial uses, courts are still reluctant
to recognize the full import of constitutional norms. 129 Motivated by
apparent visceral disapproval of certain expressive uses, such courts
have sought to justify their trademark-owner-friendly results through
subject-matter- and genre-based categories 130  of dilution liability
(specifically tarnishment). 131 Even courts that have ruled in favor of the
artist-defendant have nevertheless expressed the belief that certain
categories of expression might lead to liability. 132 The Second Circuit
suggested as much when it considered the infringement and dilution
claims of Hormel, owner of the "Spam" trademark for its pork-based
snack-meat product, against Jim Henson's use of a hog-like Muppet
named "Spa'am" in a movie. 133 Although the court protected Henson's
unauthorized use, it noted that some successful tarnishment claims have
involved unauthorized uses of a mark in the context of sexuality,
obscenity, and illegal activity such as illicit drug use. 
134
129. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996);
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1994); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1987).
130. As used in this Article, "subject-matter-based distinctions" refers to classifications based on
the substantive associations apparent in the expressive work (e.g., Coca-Cola with drug use, or
Mickey Mouse with sexuality). I am not referring to the specific manner in which it is used by First
Amendment jurisprudence regarding governmental regulation of content or subject matter. See, e.g.,
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny because
law regulating only sexual speech was a subject matter restriction). Similarly, "genre-based
distinctions" refers to classifications based on the type of expression (e.g., parody, satire, editorial).
131. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994)
("[T]amishment... is usually found [in NY state dilution case law] where a distinctive mark is
depicted in the context of sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity."); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v.
New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) ("While tamishment most
frequently occurs when a mark is used in connection with sexually explicit materials,... other
negative associations can also constitute tamishment.") (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 507 (citing Deere & Co. with approval, but
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Subject-matter-based findings of trademark liability rest upon the
notion that certain types of expressive associations are so far beyond the
bounds of reasonableness and good taste as to invite liability. On this
view, Henson's use of a cute, singing Muppet named Spa'am in a
children's movie was acceptable, whereas use of that same Muppet in an
underground comic book wherein Spa'am is engaged in sexual activity
with other Muppets may not be. This type of reasoning undergirds
several notable cases in which plaintiffs prevailed against defendants'
unauthorized uses. 
135
This subject-matter-based reasoning, however, is untenable for two
related reasons: (1) courts are not competent to make value judgments
regarding the worth of different types of speech;136 and (2) courts will
encounter a line-drawing problem, already evident in the case law.
137
The inherent problem with singling out cases for tamishment liability
based on the unwholesomeness of their respective associations-for
example, illegal drugs 13 8 or pornography 139-is that courts are essentially
being permitted to make value judgments regarding the worthiness of
specific types of speech. An artist's or commentator's legal rights should
not depend on whether an individual judge "gets" the humorist's joke or
the critic's jab.140
135. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1987) (enjoining
the defendant's use in a parody of nuclear holocaust); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (enjoining the defendant's use in a
pornographic movie); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 1031, 1040-41 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (enjoining the defendant's use where noxious and vulgar
behavior was involved); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17722, at *46-47 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (ruling that plaintiff met its burden of proof on
dilution claim against defendant's use of plaintiff's mark in a pornographic magazine); Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining the defendant's
use in the context of illicit drug use).
136. See, e.g., Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 281 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) ("Here, Yankee asks this court to engage in literary criticism--judging how successful New
York's expressive message was. It is one thing to reject a First Amendment claim because the court
disbelieves the claim that a communicative message was intended. It is quite another to reject a First
Amendment claim because the court gives low marks to the success of the literary device. Courts
are ill equipped to pass literary judgment.") (emphasis omitted).
137. Compare Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1189-91 (enjoining the distribution of a poster that
portrayed the Coca-Cola bottle design with the words "Enjoy Cocaine"), with Girl Scouts of the
U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (S.D.NY. 1969) (refusing to enjoin
the distribution of a poster depicting a pregnant Girl Scout with the ironic slogan, "Be Prepared").
138. Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1189.
139. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 203.
140. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The
determination of whether 'likelihood of confusion' exists is a factual determination."); Mut. of
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The point is showcased by comparing two cases, both of which posed
similar factual issues but were decided differently. In Coca-Cola, the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York enjoined further
sales of a poster of a Coca-Cola bottle with the altered slogan "Enjoy
Cocaine."'14 1 In Girl Scouts of the United States of America v.
Personality Posters Manufacturing Co., 142 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to enjoin distribution of a poster
of a pregnant Girl Scout and the ironic use of the Girl Scout slogan, "Be
Prepared."'' 43 The results in these cases are difficult to reconcile unless
one resorts to a values-based assessment: the Girl Scout poster is more
effective and subversive, and hence more socially valuable commentary
than the "Enjoy Cocaine" poster, which appears only to promote drug
use. The problem with this conclusion is that it leaves too much to the
skill of the advocate or the creativity of specific judges.'44 One could
plausibly read the "Enjoy Cocaine" poster in Coca-Cola as either a
reference to the Coca-Cola Company's historic usage of cocaine in its
product, or perhaps as a commentary on Coca-Cola's beverages
becoming the new pervasive drug, as addictive as cocaine, even if less
physically harmful. Under either possible explanation, the "Enjoy
Cocaine" poster arguably presents commentary and critique on par with
that of the Girl Scout poster.
This thought exercise is easily replicated. The "unwholesome" or
"disparaging" associations in cases like Mutual of Omaha, Balducci, and
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, or any other case in which the
defendant's use was enjoined, can also be reformulated into ostensibly
more "valuable" commentary or critique. 45 The dissent in Mutual of
Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398 ("Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact.").
141. Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1193.
142. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
143. Id. at 1231 (denying preliminary injunction because plaintiff "failed utterly to establish the
requisite element of customer confusion").
144. Note that in Coca-Cola, the court mentioned that consumers were actually confused, with
some writing to Coca-Cola to protest the company's apparent endorsement of drug use. See 346 F.
Supp. at 1188-89. The Girl Scouts court did not mention any such evidence of actual confusion, but
did mention that the "[p]laintiff has failed utterly to establish the requisite element of customer
confusion." See 304 F. Supp. at 1231. The significance vel non of this evidence in Coca-Cola is
discussed in further detail, infra Part III.
145. See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 402-03 (enjoining the defendant's association of plaintiffs
trademark with nuclear holocaust); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th
Cir. 1994) (enjoining the defendant's association of plaintiff's trademark with environmental
disasters); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir.
1979) (enjoining the defendant's association of plaintiff's trademark with explicit sexuality).
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Omaha made this exact point when it roundly criticized the majority's
refusal to recognize the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark as a
satirical comment on the folly of nuclear war instead of an attempt to
harm Mutual of Omaha's reputation. 146 In Balducci, the defendant was
the publisher of a magazine that used the plaintiff's "Michelob" mark in
a mock advertisement critical of the plaintiff and an oil spill that resulted
in water pollution. 147 The Eighth Circuit ruled for the trademark owner
in part because it made the judgment that the defendant's parody
unnecessarily attacked the plaintiff in communicating the defendant's
intended message.
148
These cases lead to the conclusion that by allowing judges to
determine the social value to be accorded to expressive works, courts
conduct a standardless exercise in imagination and creativity. When a
court determines liability in cases involving sexuality, obscenity, drug
use, or other "unwholesome" associations, it runs the risk of
transforming itself from a guardian of constitutional mandates into a
literary and social critic-a demotion the judiciary is ill-equipped to
handle.149 Decisions such as Coca-Cola, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
and Mutual of Omaha are incorrect to the extent they rely on private
reputational tarnishment rather than fraud and confusion in the public
marketplace. The judicial system cannot become the arbiter of good
taste; 50 as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked over a century ago,
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth [of an artistic work],
146. See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 404-05 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
147. Balducci, 28 F.3d at 772.
148. Id. (noting that the defendant's "unsupported attack," which suggested that the plaintiff's
products were contaminated with oil, was "not even remotely necessary" to the goal of commenting
on oil spill and pollution issues).
149. See Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("Here, Yankee asks this court to engage in literary criticism-judging how successful New York's
expressive message was. It is one thing to reject a First Amendment claim because the court
disbelieves the claim that a communicative message was intended. It is quite another to reject a First
Amendment claim because the court gives low marks to the success of the literary device. Courts
are ill equipped to pass literary judgment.") (emphasis omitted).
150. See Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 458
(N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (declining to enjoin film which allegedly placed the University of Notre
Dame in a negative light and injured its reputation, and stating "we may not import the role of
literary or dramatic critic into our functioning as judges in this case .... Whether [the artistic
works] are creations of merit, whether they have value only as entertainment and no value whatever
as opinion, information or education, pose questions which would require us to stake out those
elusive lines that we have been warned not to attempt ....").
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outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. 15'
The examples detailed above demonstrate that despite the First
Amendment and the statutory exemptions of the FTDA, courts have
found liability for associations related to drug use, sexuality, obscenity,
and noxious behavior. The unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of such
exceptions is that courts create line-drawing problems for themselves
and sister courts. In addition to creating a judiciary of book reviewers
and film critics with varied tastes, as a practical matter judicial attempts
to distinguish varying degrees of "social value" in speech produces an
unnavigable, and hence unusable, clutter of precedents.
Even an abridged sampling of cases demonstrates this chaos. For
example, contrast L.L. Bean, in which the court reversed an injunction
granted on motion for summary judgment against the placement of a
sexually explicit parody in a pornographic magazine, 52 with Pillsbury,
in which the court enjoined the defendant's display of the plaintiff's
mark performing a sexual act in a pornographic magazine on a dilution
claim." In Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,54 the court refused
to enjoin the defendant's manufacture of stickers and cards with the
mark "Petley Flea Bags" in an obvious, and purportedly humorous,
reference to the plaintiffs trademarked Tetley tea beverages.' 55 In
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,'
56
although similar conduct was at issue, the court granted a preliminary
injunction against the defendant's use of "Garbage Pail Kids" in
reference to plaintiffs trademark "Cabbage Patch Kids."' 57 While the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court decried the revolting juxtaposition
of a cheerleader wearing a uniform "strikingly similar" to the Dallas
Cowboys trademarked uniform with a pornographic movie,158 the court
in Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Market Group, Ltd.,'159 recently refused to
151. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
152. L.L Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987).
153. Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722, at
*40-41 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
154. 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
155. Id. at 789.
156. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
157. Id. at 1040.
158. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming preliminary injunction against a pornographic film featuring the plaintiff's
trademark).
159. 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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enjoin the defendant's parody of the plaintiffs film, Star Wars, in a
pornographic movie, Starballz. 160 These comparisons support the notion
that the subject-matter-based categorical exceptions prevalent in the
current case law are unworkable in theory and in fact.
Just as untenable as these subject-matter distinctions are distinctions
based on the genre of expression. For example, in protecting a
pornographic magazine's First Amendment right to mock L.L. Bean's
product line and mark, the First Circuit emphasized that its ruling rested
in part upon the particular genre-parody-that the defendant
employed. 161 This notion of limiting constitutional protection of
unauthorized trademark use to successful parodies also finds no support
in logic or law.'
62
One commentator has suggested that parody be explicitly protected
by trademark law; specifically, that the Lanham Act be amended to
exempt "parod[ies that] cause[] no likelihood of confusion," and that the
FTDA be amended to add an exemption of use of trademark in
parody. 163  The proposed amendment, however, would only reify
categorical assumptions regarding the relative social worth of different
types of commentary and critique. It is true that parodies, by their nature,
invite suits by trademark owners. 164 The parodist-defendant purposely
160. See id. at 901 (finding that "no reasonable consumer is likely to be confused between Star
Wars and Starballz, which is labeled as an adult film, [and] animated," and denying preliminary
injunction based on a trademark infringement claim).
161. See L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Our reluctance to
apply the anti-dilution statute to the instant case also stems from a recognition of the vital
importance of parody. Although, as we have noted, parody is often offensive, it is nevertheless
deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary
criticism.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Lucasfllm, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d at
901 (noting, in the context of an infringement claim, that "because a parody is meant to comment on
or criticize an original work, it is unlikely to be confused with the original work").
162. See Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("But the dispute as to whether New York's cover was parody misses the point. Yankee's argument
implies that the special considerations emanating from the First Amendment depend on whether the
allegedly infringing work is one of parody. That is not correct. Because unauthorized uses that
provoke litigation, both in the copyright and in the trademark field, often involve parody, the
decisions often discuss the special latitudes that are afforded to parody. But parody is merely an
example of the types of expressive content that are favored in fair use analysis under the copyright
law and First Amendment deference under the trademark law.... New York's commentary... is
an expressive message that is fully entitled to First Amendment deference, as much so as in the case
of typical parody.") (emphasis omitted).
163. See Kelly L. Baxter, Comment, Trademark Parody: How to Balance the Lanham Act With
the First Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1179, 1209 (2004).
164. See Sarah Mayhew Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee: The Chilling
Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 945
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concedes many of the elements necessary to prove infringement and
dilution, including the strength of trademark, similarity of the marks, and
intentional reproduction of the mark. 165 In addition, parodies are often
profane, and their goal is to degrade the reputation of the product.1 66 But
the fact that a particular genre is more prevalent in an area of law
provides no argument as to why it deserves explicit mention or special
protection. Constitutional concerns must be incorporated wholesale, not
piecemeal, into trademark law.
The weakness of subject-matter- and genre-based classifications is
that they are overbroad and underinclusive, sweeping in too much
valuable speech and arbitrarily protecting other types of speech. More
fundamentally, these classifications increase unpredictability in the law,
making the boundary between trademark and free expression even more
elusive. Having elucidated the problems with the private real property
analogies and the untenability of subject-matter- and genre-based
distinctions, I turn now to the third major defect in the case law.
C. Limited Holdings and Inappropriate Legal Doctrines
The third major flaw with cases regarding unauthorized trademark use
is that courts have unnecessarily stunted the growth of a simple, unified
analysis for cases involving expressive works.1 6 7 This is especially true
with infringement claims, where factual determinations of confusion can
be dispositive 1 68 In general, courts have facilitated this impotence by
cabining each case to its facts, 16 9 and refusing to allow First Amendment
(2001). Given the unique characteristics of parody, it stands to reason that corporations and other
trademark owners, or even public figures, will most often sue for unauthorized use when the use is
in the form of a parody.
165. See Steven M. Perez, Comment, Confronting Biased Treatment of Trademark Parody Under
the Lanham Act, 44 EMORY L.J. 1451, 1454 (1995).
166. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the song "Barbie Girl," which deliberately derided mores and social values ostensibly
represented by the plaintiff's "Barbie" doll); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753
(9th Cir. 1978) (discussing the defendant's underground magazine, which deliberately placed
wholesome Disney characters in lurid settings).
167. See, e.g., MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902 (failing to extend the Rogers standard beyond the
titles of works); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807-08 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing MCA Records for the proposition that Rogers applies to titles of works, then using a different
analysis for the body of expressive works).
168. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188-89 (noting
evidence of consumer confusion in the form of letters written to the plaintiff regarding the
defendant's work).
169. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808-12; Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
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protection to expand to its natural boundary with trademark law. The
result: courts have forced themselves into the unfortunate position of
having to create and/or apply inappropriate and ill-fitting legal doctrines
to justify their results. 170 Even the cases that reach the appropriate result
do so by limiting their holdings to their facts.
17 1
This Article argues that in infringement claims, the Rogers balancing
test-and the public interest factors it contemplates-is the only correct
approach to the conflict between trademark rights and free expression.
Although its approach was radically different from the private property
paradigm in cases like Coca-Cola, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, and
Pillsbury, the Rogers court did not appear to appreciate the full import of
its decision and new theoretical methodology. 172 Instead of wholly
abandoning the reasoning of such cases, the Rogers court instead chose
to distinguish Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, reading it as a case of
blatantly false advertising by the filmmaker rather than a conflict
between trademark law and free expression. 1
73
Compounding the unwillingness to expressly reject this line of
precedent, subsequent cases have chosen not to expand application of
the Rogers test far beyond the titular or cover-design context.' 74 This
limitation is unnecessary because the public interest balancing factors
could diagnose the entire panoply of unauthorized uses-whether in
titles, cover designs, literary content, or photographs. 75 Surprisingly, no
Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the Rogers
balancing analysis in refusing to enjoin the defendant's cover design parody of the plaintiffs
famous "Cliffs Notes" cover design, but stating, "[i]t is true that Rogers ... was concerned with a
very different problem from the one we have here.... This case is not about whether a title is false
advertising but whether the appearance of a work's cover is confusingly similar ... ").
170. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808-09 (using the nominative-fair-use test
to deny the plaintiffs request for an injunction).
171. Id.
172. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
173. Id. at 999 n.4.
174. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 (extending the application of the Rogers balancing
test from the titles of movies to the cover designs of literary works). In Cliffs Notes, the cover of the
defendant's book parodied the plaintiffs famous Cliffs Notes book cover. Id. at 492. Like the
Rogers court, the Cliffs Notes court explained that the expressive element inherent in a title or cover
required more protection than a mere commercial label. Id. at 495. The court reaffirmed that a
balancing approach was the best analytical tool for parodies where expression, not commercial
exploitation, was the primary intent of the artist. Id. at 495.
175. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808 (photographic series); Cliffs Notes, 886
F.2d at 494 (cover designs); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338-39
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (contents of comic book); Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 267, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (cover design); see also Ride and Prejudice, supra note 4, at 16
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court considering the question has ever articulated a persuasive reason
for this limitation other than the self-fulfilling rationale of adherence to
precedent. 176
In MCA Records, the court held that a music group's use of the
trademark name "Barbie" in the title of its song "Barbie Girl," which
poked fun at the values represented by the doll, was protected under the
Rogers test. 17 7 Under this test, the court properly held that the public's
interest in free expression greatly outweighed potential consumer
confusion created by the defendant's use of the Barbie name in the title
"Barbie Girl."'' 78 However, by reaffirming the limited unauthorized uses
to which the test would apply-namely, the titles of artistic works 179 -
the court was able to reach the correct result only at the expense of
prolonging the unpredictability in this area. of law Because the court
failed to clarify the proper treatment of non-titular unauthorized uses by
artificially limiting the reach of constitutional standards in infringement
actions,1 80  it placed expressive works that choose to reference
trademarks without permission at risk. This danger quickly became more
than academic. 181
Soon after MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of
unauthorized trademark use in the title and body of an artistic work,
once more dealing with Mattel's attempts to protect its Barbie
trademark. 82 In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,83 the
court concluded that the defendant's photographic series, "Food Chain
Barbie," which depicted nude and dismantled Barbie dolls in various
absurd and sexual situations involving food preparation, did not violate
trademark, copyright, or trade libel law. 184 Uneasy about extending the
(discussing a novelist who wrote a book for Bulgari, a jewelry manufacturer).
176. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808 n.14.
177. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
178. Id. The court, concluding that defendant's use was noncommercial, also affirmed summary
judgment dismissal of Mattel's dilution claims based on defendant's First Amendment rights. See
id. at 906-07.
179. Id. at 902.
180. Id.; see also Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808-09.
181. See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 807-12 (evaluating the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendant for its use of the "Barbie" trademark in the title of a
photographic work and for using Barbie dolls in the photographic series comprising the body of the
expressive work).
182. Id.
183. 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
184. Id. at 816 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on all
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MCA Records holding, however, the court eschewed application of the
balancing test to both title and content, instead analyzing each
separately. 185
As a result of overly cautious and limited applications of the Rogers
balancing test, courts have resorted to the fair use doctrine to protect
First Amendment interests. 186  For example, in Walking Mountain
Productions, the court noted that it was unclear whether the Rogers test
applied beyond the titular context; in regard to Mattel's trade dress
claim, based on the use of the Barbie dolls, the court chose not to apply
the balancing test. 8 7 Instead, the court affirmed dismissal of the
infringement claim leveled against the content of the work, holding that
Mattel's trade dress infringement claim could be disposed of under the
Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use defense for trademark.
88
Undoubtedly, the nominative fair use doctrine allows a federal court to
avoid tackling constitutional issues to resolve a relatively mundane
substantive claims).
185. Id. at 807-09.
186. See, e.g., id. at 808-12 (using nominative fair use in expressive context); New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992) (using nominative fair use to
evaluate a newspaper's use of the plaintiff's trademark and name).
187. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808 n. 14.
188. Best illustrated by cases like Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002),
and New Kids on the Block, nominative-fair-use cases typically involve commercial use of a
plaintiff's trademark for the purpose of identifying or describing defendant's product. In Cairns, for
example, the trustees and executors of Princess Diana's memorial fund and estate brought suit
against the manufacturer of commercially sold jewelry, plates, and dolls that bore the unauthorized
name and likeness of Princess Diana. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1149-50. To evaluate infringement when
defendant asserts nominative-fair-use protection, the multi-factored likelihood-of-confusion test is
replaced by the tripartite nominative-fair-use test: (1) the plaintiff's product must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the mark; (2) only so much of the mark may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify plaintiff's product; and (3) the defendant must do nothing that would suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by plaintiff. Id. at 1151 (citing New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at
308). Applying this test, the Cairns court found that the defendant's use of Princess Diana's name
and likeness on their wares was reasonable to identify and describe defendant's product, and was
therefore protected as a nominative fair use. Id. at 1155. Other recent cases have also resulted in
decisions favorable to the defendants. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 816 (refusing
to enjoin the defendant's photographic series); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806
(9th Cir. 2002) (protecting a former model's use of the plaintiff's trademark on her website as
nominative fair use); New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309 (protecting the defendants-
newspapers' use of the plaintiff-band's name as nominative fair use).
When a defendant uses a plaintiff's mark to describe the defendant's product and not at all to
describe or identify the plaintiff's product, the defendant may assert trademark law's classic fair use
defense, codified in 15 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2000), by proving three elements: (1) that the defendant's
use of the mark is not as a trademark; (2) that the defendant used the mark fairly and in good faith;
and (3) that the defendant uses the mark only to describe its product. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150-51.
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trademark dispute. Courts are wont to avoid potentially far-reaching
constitutional questions where such questions are unnecessary to reach a
result. 189 This reasoning is circular: inartful application of a doctrine like
nominative fair use becomes necessary only because courts have been
unwilling to simplify the constitutional analysis in this area through a
consistent, uniform application of a free speech standard. More
fundamentally, courts err when they employ doctrines such as
nominative fair use because doing so essentially reduces an artist's or
expressionist's privilege to that of a competitor. Axiomatic to the
Lanham Act, First Amendment jurisprudence, and common sense is the
principle that commercial competitors are subject to limitations
inapplicable to non-competitor artists. 190
Moreover, nominative fair use is inapplicable beyond the
commercially competitive arena. First, the "fair use" exemption within
the FTDA applies only to "fair use... in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services .'. ,,191 Second, virtually every nominative and classic fair use
case in trademark law involves plaintiffs and defendants who are in
commercial and competitive situations. 192 Third, employment of a
doctrine like fair use represents a regression into consideration of private
concerns.
Both classic and nominative fair use doctrines are "defenses,"
intended to carve out limited exceptions from the backdrop of protection
for privately-owned intellectual property. 193 By their terms, both
doctrines restrict the quality and quantity of a defendant's use, limiting
the motivation, quantity, and quality of that use. 194 These proscriptions
189. See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 808 n.14 ("By instead employing the nominative
fair use test.., we are following the time-honored tradition of avoiding constitutional questions
where narrower grounds are available.") (citations omitted).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (providing an exemption for noncommercial use that is
unavailable for commercial use); cf Landes & Posner, supra note 120, and accompanying text
(discussing economic incentives that inform the application of trademark laws in commercial
settings).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1149-51 (noting that defendant sold memorabilia with Princess
Diana's likeness, conduct in which plaintiff also engaged); Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 806
(describing the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark to help market and publicize her
website).
193. See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150-51 (describing the classic fair use defense and placing the
burden of proof on the defendant).
194. See id. at 1150 (enumerating factors for both classic and nominative fair use).
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are anathema to the public's weighty interest in free expression. The
legal requirements for the fair use defenses are not tied to public interest
rationales; rather, they represent the balancing of the trademark owner's
purely private property interest versus the defendant's right to use
plaintiff's trademark only as a source-identifier or a tool for comparative
advertising. 195 By shifting the focus to these interests, the application of
doctrines such as fair use resurrects the discredited reliance on unlimited
private real property rights.'
96
Ironically, given the justifications proffered for application of the
balancing test to titles of artistic works, it makes even less sense to use a
separate analysis for the content and body of those same works.
Consistent with economic and incentive-based theories of trademark
protection, 197 unauthorized use of trademark within the body of an
expressive work-but not in the title, cover, or advertisement for the
work-reduces the risk that defendant is trying to "free-ride" on the
plaintiffs commercial reputation or capitalize on an unbargained-for
commercial advantage from the plaintiff.198 Unlike a work's title, which
clearly has severable market significance for advertising and source-
identification, the contents of the work are generally presented in context
and with explanation. Therefore, it is even less likely that any
countervailing private concerns exist to override the free expression
195. Id. (omitting public interest factors in enumerated classic and nominative fair use tests).
196. At least one trial court has extended use of the balancing test beyond artistic titles, to alleged
infringement occurring within the body and substance of a defendant's expression. See Charles
Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 335-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing the
plaintiff's claim that the defendants used its trademarked advertisement promoting its body building
courses to develop the character and story line for the defendant's comic character, Flex Mentallo).
Rejecting the plaintiff's infringement claims, the court in Charles Atlas extensively detailed the
First Amendment value of the defendant's comic book, heavily weighting the free speech half of the
scale. Id. at 337-39. The opinion calls for robust application of the First Amendment where the
unauthorized use occurs in the "interior" of a work (here, a comic book) because such use provides
further evidence that the defendant's use was part of a storyline rather than to advance a competing,
confusing product. Id. at 338-39. On the confusion side of the scale, the court noted that the non-
competitive nature of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective products and expressions, the
sophistication of consumers, and the lack of empirical evidence of confusion ensured that the
likelihood of confusion was "slim." Id. at 341.
197. See Landes & Posner, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
198. Cf. Felix the Cat Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema Corp., CV 99-9339 FMC (RXc), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21763, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the defendant's unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's character in a movie and stating that by the time the audience sees the plaintiff's
trademarked character, "defendants have already reaped their harvest of ticket revenue. Defendants'
financial success neither depends on, nor is affected by, the goodwill associated with [plaintiffs
mark]. The use of [plaintiff's mark] is thus not an advertisement").
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interests. Again, this limitation of the case law serves only to hide the
parameters of trademark law vis-A-vis public free expression concerns.
These three major flaws in the case law-incomplete private property
analogies, untenable subject-matter- and genre-based distinctions, and
unnecessarily limited reasoning-collectively contribute to the blurred
boundary between trademarks and free expression. More fundamentally,
they render the case law relatively useless as a predictive tool for future
cases. Part III proposes a solution to these difficulties and presents a
defense of that solution.
III. UNAUTHORIZED TRADEMARK USE IN EXPRESSIVE
WORKS: THE PROPER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
By its successes and failures, the case law reveals that the long-
running conflict between a private real property model of trademark law
and the First Amendment is on the verge of being definitively settled in
favor of First Amendment concerns. Applying the proper analytical
framework to federal or state claims based on either confusion or
dilution, the rights of trademark owners do not trump the First
Amendment rights of artists, publishers, and commentators in their
unauthorized expressive use of marks. If a defendant engages in
noncommercial speech-i.e., speech that does more than propose a
commercial transaction-the defendant's unauthorized use of a
plaintiffs trademark is always protected from dilution liability. In
dilution claims, defendant artists will prevail against claims of
reputational harm suffered by mark owners because such harm is not
sufficient to trump free speech concerns. Likewise, a defendant's use of
a mark is protected from confusion-based infringement liability so long
as the public interest in free expression clearly outweighs the potential
confusion in the marketplace. As minimal levels of confusion will be
insufficient to overcome the free speech ideal, the balance will
presumptively favor defendant artists and allow them to prevail in
confusion-based infringement claims. This framework and its implied
presumption would apply regardless of whether the trademark is used in
the title or content of a work, or of the medium in which the trademark is
presented, be it a sticker, t-shirt, magazine, poster, or movie. The
approach this Article presents delineates the boundary between
trademark law and free expression. In addition, it simplifies judicial
decision-making and creates greater predictability for artists, parodists,
satirists, authors, and filmmakers who choose to reference, disparage, or
otherwise present trademarks in their works.
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As courts begin to use this proposed framework, trademark owners
will, as some already have, develop strategies to liken their marks to
other protected private property, such as copyright.'1 99 Fortunately, courts
have foreclosed these avenues. 2°° Having traveled a great distance from
the shopping mall at issue in Lloyd, trademark law in the context of
expressive works must find the right balance between private and public
concerns.
Mark owners err when they view this debate as a forced choice
between the two extremes of complete private property protection and
free-for-all public use. Abandonment of a private real property anchor
does not sink trademark owners into a protection-less "anarchy."'2 '
199. See, e.g., id. (noting that the plaintiff had argued for trademark-like protection for copyright
claim); cf Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema Corp., 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting plaintiff's attempt to circumvent copyright law by invoking trademark law).
200. Plaintiffs have attempted to argue for copyright-like protection for their marks, which would
give them greater ability to control the use and reference of their marks against all potential users,
regardless of the First Amendment. See Comedy III Prods., 200 F.3d at 595; Felix the Cat Prods.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21763, at *10-11. Trademark law was never intended to provide, and has
never provided, this type of protection; rather, such blanket control over intellectual property is
reserved only for copyrights. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6. First, the U.S. Constitution does
not expressly grant property rights in trademarks, as it does for patents and copyrights. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8. Second, whereas copyright law gives the author the right to prevent
unauthorized copying of his particular expression ab initio, trademark law originally only prevented
use of marks that would cause confusion with the public; mere reproduction of a trademark, with
nothing more, will not state an infringement or dilution claim, because simple copying will not
necessarily degrade the goodwill of the trademark. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:14.
Undoubtedly, both trademark and copyright law can protect multiple aspects of the same product.
This does not mean, however, that copyright protections can be substituted for trademark laws, or
vice versa. Id. § 6:17.1. Asserting copyright claims with trademark claims presupposes that the
material referenced or used is copyrightable or maintains current copyright protection. Even when a
product contains copyrightable aspects, however, the analyses for each type of intellectual property
must be kept distinct. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 799-808
(9th Cir. 2003) (applying copyright law's fair use test to copyright claims, but applying trademark
law's distinctive fair use analysis to trademark claims). As the Ninth Circuit stated in response to a
plaintiff's argument that its Three Stooges film footage used in a movie was a protectable
trademark, "the footage at issue here was clearly covered by the Copyright Act... and the Lanham
Act cannot be used to circumvent copyright law." Comedy III Prods., 200 F.3d at 595. Expanding
on this pronouncement, a California district court, rejecting very similar trademark and copyright
claims by the owner of a copyrighted cartoon clip used in a movie without permission, noted:
Reading the allegations of plaintiffs complaint broadly, it appears that plaintiff presents a
straight-forward copyright case. The complaint alleges a copyright interest and unauthorized
copying by defendants. In contrast, the complaint's multiple attempts at invoking trademark
law would require the Court to extend trademark law beyond commercial use and make
actionable the expression of an idea in a motion picture.
Felix the Cat Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21763, at * 10.
201. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that efforts to create a legal regime with less
restrictive copyright laws "have failed because the debate has become so polarized and so binary
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Discussing copyright protection, Professor Lessig has noted this false
dichotomy between, as he puts it, "the alls and the nones": "[T]he world
is not divided into two, but into three. There are those who believe in all
rights reserved, those who believe in no rights at all, but there are also
many who believe that some rights should be controlled but not all. 2 °2 I
argue for trademark, as Lessig has for copyright, that the proper judicial
framework takes the sensible middle-ground between these two poles.
The Rogers balancing test achieves this middle ground in
infringement cases. First, the test retains the likelihood-of-confusion
analysis on one side of the scale.2 °3 Therefore, trademark owners may
still prevail upon presenting evidence of actual confusion and market
fraud. Second, the test requires that the unauthorized use bear some
minimal relevance to the expressive work.204 This factor ensures that the
expressive work is a genuine contribution to the culture, and not a
commercial free-ride. Neither of these concerns would be present in
either a purely private- or a purely public-concern-oriented regime.
The balanced framework proposed here-applying the Rogers test to
infringement cases and fully recognizing First Amendment concerns in
dilution cases-is subject to critiques that it (1) is based on an incorrect
understanding of legislative purpose and statutory construction, and (2)
renders trademark law's protection of mark owners' rights toothless.
Undoubtedly, this framework will yield more defendant-friendly
decisions that safeguard unauthorized trademark use in expressive
works. This should be no cause for alarm. It represents an appropriate
course correction, saving us from the cultural monopoly that results from
a "permission society" and a "licensed culture. '20 5 Nevertheless, because
this proposed methodology carries a strong presumption in favor of
artists, parodists, humorists, filmmakers, and writers, it is certainly
unsettling to corporate and private interests.
The nub of the first objection is that the FTDA exemption of
noncommercial uses reflects Congress's desire to protect free expression
concerns in federal dilution claims only. By not providing a parallel
that the choice seems a choice just between property and anarchy. And in that world, there is no
choice for us except property").
202. Id. at 10.
203. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
204. Id. (noting that the film's title bore relevance to the film's content); see Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The first prong of Rogers requires a determination of
whether there is any artistic relationship between the title and the underlying work.").
205. Lessig, supra note 16, at 9-10; Lessig, supra note 126, at 771.
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exemption for infringement claims,2 06 the argument goes, Congress did
not intend to so broadly protect all trademark claims. Therefore, a
unified approach cannot be employed; the analysis must be bifurcated
according to type of trademark claim, with infringement claims and state
dilution claims receiving little First Amendment protection. The ready
and facile response is that to the extent the core of the First
Amendment's protection is implicated, it is not Congress's choice to
deny or limit protection to infringement or state dilution claims. The
more sophisticated response engages the nature and essence of the two
types of claims, leading to the conclusion that a statutory exemption is
relevant for dilution claims but would be superfluous for infringement
actions.2
0 7
Embodiment of the constitutional ideal of free speech within the
FTDA makes sense because, in the absence of consistent judicial
protection of First Amendment concerns, 2 8 artistic works alleged to be
dilutive need explicit statutory protection against blurring and
tarnishment suits. The statutory protection for expressive works from
dilution claims recognizes that a plaintiffs private interest in pursuing a
dilution claim (especially a tarnishment claim that focuses on
reputational harm) is not closely allied with a parallel public interest.
209
The public and private interests do not symbiotically coexist as they do
in consumer-confusion-based infringement claims.210 In contrast to
infringement claims, the dilution claimant does not simultaneously
implicate significant public interests, such as preventing consumer
206. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (no exemption for expressive uses), with id. § 1125.
(express exemption for expressive uses).
207. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
because of inherent limitations, "dilution injunctions ... lack the built-in First Amendment compass
of trademark injunctions").
208. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting legislative
history demonstrating that First Amendment concerns led sponsors of the FTDA to create "fair use"
and "noncommercial" exceptions to federal dilution liability); MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906
(noting legislative history demonstrating that the sponsors of the FTDA responded to First
Amendment concerns by relying on the noncommercial exception).
209. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against
trademark dilution ... are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
210. Compare Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989) (evaluating infringement
case where plaintiff's private interest in protecting the value of her name is allied with the potential
public interest in not being misled as to plaintiff's endorsement of the film), with L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-33 (1st Cir. 1987) (evaluating dilution case where
plaintiff's private interest in keeping wholesome associations for its trademark unallied with
potential public interest in humor and pornography).
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fraud.211
The claim here is not that works alleged to be infringing are any less
worthy of receiving constitutional consideration. Rather, the reality is
that infringement law inherently accounts for free expression concerns in
a way dilution law, prior to the FTDA, did not.2 12 The key factor limiting
an infringement action's reach and ensuring its peaceful coexistence
with free expression principles is its foundation in the idea of avoiding
confusion. For example, injunctions in infringement actions are confined
only to those trademark uses that are likely to confuse consumers or
cause fraud, basically limiting the reach of the injunction to competitors
attempting to gain commercial advantage over the trademark owner.213
With dilution, the allegedly violative use is not always by a competitor;
therefore, the injunctions have a potentially broader reach, possibly
enjoining an entire marketing campaign, movie, song, or line of non-
competing products.214 With infringement, injunctions are issued to
protect consumers from "what is essentially a fraud," and this rationale
is "wholly consistent with the theory of the First Amendment, which
does not protect commercial fraud., 215 Thus, when trademark law sticks
to its traditional role of avoiding confusion in the marketplace, it has
little likelihood of hindering free expression.216 Trademark law threatens
to exceed its proper boundary only when it leaves the realm of confusion
and meanders into the quagmire of reputational harms alleged in dilution
claims.
Without careful proscription, dilution laws-by allowing trademark
owners to sue for reputational harms-have the potential to extend
211. See Schlosser, supra note 164, at 946-56 (arguing that dilution claims, as opposed to
infringement claims, function more as earned property rights, inuring solely to the benefit of the
trademark owner, without concomitant public interest value to offset free speech concerns).
212. Compare Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc, No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17722, at *37-38 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (granting preliminary injunction, based in part, on the
court's analysis of the infringement claim against the magazine's use of plaintiff's trade characters
engaged in sexual acts), with Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-
01 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying preliminary injunction that would have prohibited a film's reference
to the plaintiff's trademark in an animated pornographic film under the FTDA noncommercial use
exemption).
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a), (2) (2000); id. § 11 16(d)(4)(B), (d)(l 1).
214. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that "direct competition" with the plaintiff's product is an "important, even if not determinative,
factor" in assessing the viability of a tamishment claim).
215. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
216. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 973 (1993).
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trademark law into areas it was never intended to reach.217 It may be
reasonable to prohibit a commercial competitor from altering,
destroying, or presenting a competing trademark of another trademark
owner.21 8 But what is reasonable for competitors is arbitrary and stifling
when applied to artists.
The second critique-that broad, expression-friendly protection for
defendants renders trademark law toothless-is misplaced because the
proposed framework does not close all remedies for mark owners
seeking to enjoin unauthorized expressive use of their mark. With the
proper evidentiary production, the Rogers balancing test leaves ample
opportunity for mark owners to prevail even when the unauthorized use
occurs in an expressive context.219 Also, under the proposed framework,
mark owners are not hindered from prevailing on claims against
competitors or those attempting solely to gain a commercial
advantage. 220 Admittedly, a mark owner will find it difficult to enjoin
unauthorized expressive use on a dilution claim, but so long as there is a
sufficient evidentiary showing of possible confusion, mark owners will
be able to enjoin the unauthorized use on an infringement claim.
217. See Kravitz, supra note 81, at 143, 184 (arguing that the "tarnishment rationale potentially
extends the sweep of trademark protection virtually without limit" and that dilution law "may
jeopardize the richness of free discourse we so highly treasure").
218. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994). The Deere
court considered dilution claims by Deere against a competitor who had presented Deere's famous
deer logo in an altered and unflattering manner in a television commercial. Id. at 43-45. First, the
court noted that the defendant's use risked tarnishing the plaintiff's mark. Id. at 45. Specifically, the
court noted that defendant's alteration and degradation of Deere's trademark carried a risk of injury
to Deere's business and trademark reputation that could not be tolerated when the interest was
solely commercial-here, promoting defendant's competing products. Id. at 44-45. Second, the
court noted that dilution was most likely to be found where, as in Deere, the alleged violator was a
competitor of the plaintiff. Id. at 45.
Note, however, that commercial competitors may use another's trademark if the competitor is
using the mark only to identify the mark owner or is using the mark in comparative advertising. Id.
at 44; cf Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (protecting the
defendant's reference to plaintiff's mark to identify the plaintiff and plaintiffs relationship to
defendant).
219. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that First Amendment
concerns "do not insulate" titles of artistic works and requiring "some artistic relevance" to the
underlying work). Presumably, more than de minimus amounts of confusion would have led to
infringement liability. See also discussion infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text regarding
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders and Coca-Cola.
220. Cf Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031,
1038 (N.D. Ga. 1986). As argued infra, even under the Rogers standard a plaintiff could prevail in a
case like Original Appalachian Artworks if it could show a purely commercial free-ride without
countervailing expressive context.
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Under this framework, plaintiff trademark-owners are not wholly
without recourse in scenarios presented in cases such as Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Coca-Cola, or Original Appalachian Artworks. Plaintiffs
in such cases may seek a determination that the confusion engendered by
a defendant's use outweighs any free expression concerns. For example,
under the Rogers balancing test, the plaintiff in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders may very well prevail on the theory that the posters used
in advertising the film were excessively confusing. The posters at issue
depicted the lead actress of the pornographic movie wearing a uniform
strikingly similar to the real Dallas Cowboys cheerleader uniform,
accompanied with captions like "Starring Ex Dallas Cowgirl
Cheerleader Bambi Woods" and "You'll do more than cheer for this X
Dallas Cheerleader., 221 Because the poster could confuse and mislead
consumers into believing that an actual ex-Dallas Cowboys cheerleader
was participating in the pornographic movie, the court's opinion could
be recast as one of the rare instances in which the public confusion
concern outweighs free speech concerns. The court's real dilemma on
this view is the extent and nature of the remedy.222 Likewise, in both
Coca-Cola and Original Appalachian Artworks, the courts noted the
strong likelihood of confusion, based on actual market confusion. 23
Taken together, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Coca-Cola, and
221. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202-03 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the plaintiff's trademarks included "Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,"
"Dallas Cowgirls," and "Texas Cowgirls").
222. See Kravitz, supra note 81, at 150 (suggesting that if the court were perturbed by the
misleading advertisements in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the proper remedy, consistent with the
First Amendment, would have been to enjoin only the advertising, but not the movie). Under this
view, the problem is that the injunction was too broad and swept in protected speech, in the form of
the movie, along with unprotected speech, in the form of the advertisements.
Another related problem is courts' predilection toward injunctions instead of monetary damages.
See Alison P. Howard, Comment, A Fistful of Lawsuits: The Press, the First Amendment, and
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 88 CAL L. REV. 127, 173 (2000) (criticizing, based on First
Amendment principles, courts' preference for injunctions instead of damages). Arguably, for
commercial uses that tarnish a trademark, particularly if a non-competing product is tarnished, the
value of the mark may be diminished, but the public is not necessarily harmed. In such cases, where
the damage is mainly private, it makes little sense to restrict public speech. Monetary damages
equivalent to the loss in value of the mark serve as an appropriate and commensurate remedy.
223. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting
that the plaintiff presented evidence of actual customer confusion in the form of letters from many
customers around the country who believed Coca-Cola was. promoting drug use); Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
(noting that the purchasers of Cabbage Patch Kids and Garbage Pail Kids were basically the same-
young children-and that the evidence demonstrated that those consumers associated the
defendant's products with the plaintiff's mark).
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Original Appalachian Artworks also suggest that the modes of
expression may enhance the likelihood of public confusion. As neither a
poster, nor a sticker, nor a t-shirt is part of a larger expressive work, each
one acts as an attention-getting, built-in marketing tool for the products.
In other words, the unauthorized expressive use is selling nothing but
itself.22 4 That fact alone does not limit constitutional protection for these
types of expression, but the medium of expression could impact the
likelihood of confusion analysis. Because larger, more substantial
expressive works provide contexts and explanations that would dispel
confusion to a greater extent than a poster or sticker, it may be
appropriate to consider the medium of expression as one factor in the
confusion side of the balancing test. At least one recently filed case will
probe the intersection between mode of expression, context, and
likelihood of confusion.225
Despite the possibility of finding trademark infringement liability
based on evidence of actual confusion, the balancing test will still weigh
224. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (limiting the
injunction to the defendant's use of an altered trademark on t-shirts, coffee mugs, and buttons, but
not precluding the defendant from using the altered trademark in books, magazines, or films).
225. Car-Freshner Corp., owner of the famous pine-tree air freshener trademark, recently sued
Comdog Cards & Novelties for trademark infringement and state-law unfair competition based on
the defendant's use of the pine-tree mark and likeness on a glowing, "scratch-and-sniff' novelty
greeting card. See Jordan Smith, The Odd Case ofPinetree v. Corndog, AUSTIN CHRON., May 13,
2005, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2005-05-13/pols-feature7.html;
Casey Dickinson, Car-Freshner Sues Texas Company, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J., Apr. 29, 2005, available
at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3718/is_200504/ainl3639795/print. Although Car-
Freshner has aggressively litigated to protect its mark in the past with some success, defendant
Comdog Cards has, at this early stage of the suit, shown no signs of capitulating to the plaintiffs
cease-and-desist demands, instead arguing that its unauthorized use of the mark is protected parody.
See Smith, supra (noting that Car-Freshner has filed at least four federal trademark suits since
2002); Defendant's Answer at 3, Car-Freshner Corp. v. Detwiler, No. 05-CV-0436-TJM-GHL
(N.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 2005) (on file with author); see, e.g., Car-Freshner Corp. v. Big Lots
Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145, 154 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff).
Defendants argue that the pine-tree logo on a Christmas card is an obviously humorous take on the
use of an air-freshener pine tree as a Christmas tree. Defendant's Answer at 2, Car-Freshner Corp.
v. Detwiler, No. 05-CV-0436-TJM-GHL. The facts of the case present issues nearly identical to
cases like Original Appalachian Artworks, Tetley Tea Bags, or Mutual of Omaha because the
context surrounding the claimed "parody" is limited and the overall environment of the use arguably
does not provide enough substance to mitigate the likelihood of public confusion. Given the analysis
I proffer, however, on balance it would appear that here, where there is a difference in (1) consumer
markets and (2) consumer expectations created by "novelty" greeting cards, trademark liability
should not attach. Judge Thomas J. McAvoy of the District Court for the Northern District of New
York, despite having ruled in favor of Car-Freshner on previous claims of infringement against
commercial competitors, would be justified in ruling for defendant here based on its First
Amendment defense. Big Lots, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
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heavily in favor of defendants. The nature of the factors considered in
the multi-factored likelihood-of-confusion tests render it unlikely that
courts will find confusion stemming from expressive works.226
Specifically, the probable outcomes of two factors forcefully skew the
likelihood of confusion analysis outcome: (1) consumer sophistication;
and (2) the context of the unauthorized use. For example, in Hormel, the
court reasoned that children who watched the Muppets were familiar
with the Muppets' brand of humor and would not be deceived into
thinking that Hormel had endorsed the movie character Spa'am 7 In
Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,228 the defendant, producer of the
children's movie George of the Jungle, used the plaintiff s bulldozers in
a scene where movie villains were about to destroy a forest. 2 9 The court
denied Caterpillar's request for an injunction against the filmmaker,
noting that both children and parents were aware of the cartoonish and
fantastical nature of the film and would not be fooled into associating
appearance in the film with sponsorship of the film. 230 Courts are willing
to engage in a detailed examination of the actual consumer, giving
credence to the consumers' ability to discern and differentiate, even
when those consumers are children. 23' Given the virtually universal
application of these two factors to any trademark use in an artistic or
expressive setting, plaintiffs claiming infringement should only
occasionally be able to prevail on a claim against use of their products in
expressive works.
Courts have also made the practical determination that the more
disparaging, misused, comical, and/or negative the portrayal of the
trademarked product, the less likely it is that a reasonable consumer
would be fooled into thinking that the trademark owner endorsed the
226. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the likelihood-of-confusion test.
227. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996).
228. 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. I11. 2003).
229. Id. at 921-22.
230. See id. at 917, 923 (denying plaintiff machinery-manufacturer's motion for a temporary
restraining order against makers of the George of the Jungle animated movie, where the plaintiff
claimed that the use of its trademark on bulldozers as the instruments of deforestation infringed and
tarnished plaintiff's trademark).
231. See Hornel, 73 F.3d at 502; Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 921-23. But see Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (failing to
examine the intended consumer to discern whether that consumer would associate the plaintiff with
the defendant's pornographic movie and stating "[i]ndeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had
seen defendants' sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiffs
cheerleaders.").
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portrayal.232 In denying the plaintiffs infringement claim in MCA
Records, the court noted that the "only indication" of Mattel's
association with the song was the use of "Barbie" in the title;233 the
lyrics of the song, which target and mock the values arguably
represented by the doll, however, would not cause consumer confusion
as to Mattel's sponsorship because they derided Barbie's image instead
of celebrating it.
234
Although I suggest that my model strikes the correct balance between
trademarks and free expression, mark owners may still protect against
egregious unauthorized uses in expressive works where there is no
confusion by challenging the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of
commercial speech. If the scope of noncommercial speech is narrowed,
the balance between trademark and free expression would shift in favor
of private concerns. Thus, the critical question is whether sufficient
reasons exist to foment a sea change in the U.S. Supreme Court's
commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy. In Part IV, I explore the
Court's current jurisprudence and consider scenarios that may force
reconsideration of the commercial speech doctrine, focusing specifically
on the issue of product placements in movies. The predicted weakness of
trademark law in the new paradigm may only be temporary.
IV. THE REAL QUESTION: SHOULD EXPRESSIVE USE
ALWAYS COUNT AS NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH?
What should be clear by now is that once an unauthorized trademark
use is determined to be "expressive" or "noncommercial," mark owners
should have difficulty prevailing in a trademark action.235 Without
showing a likelihood of confusion, the conduct falls outside the bounds
of trademark law.236 Thus, trademark owners are misguided, or at the
very least inefficiently spending their resources, if they attempt to enjoin
232. See, e.g., Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Although plaintiffs allegations of customer confusion as to the source of the
fictional [TV] channel are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the [clourt notes that '[w]here
the use of the mark is in an unflattering context or setting which would be disadvantageous to the
mark's holder, it would seem customer confusion as to endorsement or affiliation is particularly
unlikely."') (quoting Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enters., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232,
1242 (D. Md. 1996)).
233. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
234. Id. at 901.
235. See supra Parts 1I & III; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
236. See supra Parts 11 & 111; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
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noncommercial uses based on a paradigm of private-property-like
control or categorical liability for unwholesome associations.
Instead of attempting to reinvigorate bankrupt judicial modes, a
trademark owner would be better advised to concentrate on the question
that silently frames the conflict: what types of expression constitute
commercial or noncommercial speech? The relevance of this question is
especially poignant in filmmaking because of the ever-evolving
symbiosis of artistic and commercial elements in modem-day motion
pictures.237 The use and placement of trademarked products in movies
has expanded exponentially since the movie E. T., with trademarked
products prominently finding their way into dozens of movies. 238 A new
industry of specialized product placement firms, separate and distinct
from general-advertising firms, has popped up in Hollywood and other
major entertainment centers.239  In many instances, a product's
appearance in a movie causes the product's sales to skyrocket.240 Even
so, most companies, realizing that not every use of their trademarked
237. See A.O. Scott, Post-Popism, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 7, 2005, at 11 ("Of course,
nobody bothers to complain much anymore that the movies themselves have become
advertisements. Product placement has turned the movie screen into a moving billboard .... ).
A famous use of a trademarked product is E.T.'s predilection for Reese's Pieces candy. When
candy maker M & M's refused to consent to the appearance of their trademarked product in the
Steven Spielberg-directed blockbuster, the filmmakers approached Hershey's, who gave its
permission for the use of its trademarked Reese's Pieces in the film. The sale of Reese's Pieces
skyrocketed as its popularity with children soared after its appearance in the movie. Amazingly,
Hershey's never paid for the showcasing of their product, instead agreeing to a tie-in marketing
campaign after the movie's release placements. Frank Zazza, Product Placement Valuation &
Product Placement News: Special Report, iTVX, http://www.itvx.com/SpecialReport.asp (last
visited Oct. 20, 2005). One estimate placed Hershey's windfall at a 65% increase in sales of Reese's
Pieces following its use in E. T. Claudine R. Cleophat, A Content Analysis of African-American-
Oriented Programming on United Paramount Network (Aug. 9, 2005) (unpublished Honors Thesis,
Florida State University) (on file with Florida State University D-Scholarship Repository), available
at http://dscholarship.lib.fsu.edu/undergrad/123/; cf Zazza, supra (stating that Hershey's received
an 80% increase in sales). When Spielberg's lovable alien chose Hershey's candy, pervasive
product placement in the movies was born.
238. See Lights, Camera, Brands, supra note 4, at 61 (noting that the product placement market
in 2004 was worth $3.5 billion); Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is
Hollywood Turning Films into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 301, 305-07 (listing
famous product placements in movies).
239. See generally Product Placement News, http://www.productplacement.biz/ (last visited Sept.
1, 2005); Hollywood Product Placement, http://www.hollywoodproductplacement.com/ (last visited
Sept. 1, 2005). The product placement industry has become large and noticeable enough to have
inspired mocking parodies on the internet. See Product Placement Awards,
http://www.productplacementawards.com (purporting to present awards for the best product
placements) (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
240. See supra notes 237-39.
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products will have the "E.T. effect," have assiduously sought to control
their image by carefully monitoring the use of their trademarks in
advertisements, magazines, posters, paintings, and motion pictures.241
Consequently, filmmakers and movie studios have sought and acquired
permission from the trademark owners before displaying those marks in
their movies.242
With the increased attention to the financial windfalls and advertising
potential in major motion pictures, films may soon present thorny
categorization questions under the U.S. Supreme Court's commercial
speech doctrine. Concomitantly, with increased product placements, the
risk of trademark-infringement liability is also heightened. Using the
movie industry as an example, this Part will discuss the importance of
the noncommercial speech designation, demonstrating how ripening
conflicts in the product placement arena will require courts to more
precisely define commercial and noncommercial speech which will lead
to the appropriate balance between trademarks and free speech.
A. The Advent of Product Placement and Current Analysis of Motion
Pictures Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized for decades that "expression
by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free
press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 243 Even while
firmly placing motion pictures on the same First Amendment pedestal as
newspapers and literary works, the Supreme Court has cautioned:
It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places. ... Nor does it follow that motion pictures
241. See Snyder, supra note 238, at 303-08; see, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods.,
Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to enjoin the defendant's use of a Muppet character
named Spa'am in apparent reference to the plaintiffs meat-product, Spam); Car-Freshner Corp. v.
Detwiler, No. 05-CV-0436-TJM-GHL (N.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 2005) (on file with author)
(discussing the plaintiffs attempts to enjoin a greeting card company from using the plaintiffs
"pine-tree" trademark on humorous card); Dale Buss, A Product-Placement Hall of Fame, Bus.
WEEK, June 11, 1998, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1998/25fb3583062.htm
(recounting the most effective product placements from 1982 to 1998).
242. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 4, at 1626-28 (noting that filmmakers ask for LAPD
acquiescence in using LAPD trademarks in part to maintain good relationships with the LAPD);
Friedman, supra note 4, at 690; see also Lights, Camera, Brands, supra note 4, at 61 ("In the film
industry, a lot of product-placement deals are made in return for a brand spending large sums
marketing the association with the film, as well as for hard cash.").
243. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
Washington Law Review
are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other
particular method of expression. Each method tends to present
its own peculiar problems.244
Speaking in 1952, the Court could not have anticipated that one of those
"particular problems" would be the advent of product placement in
motion pictures and its troublesome implications for the Court's then-
unwritten commercial speech doctrine.
When applied to a movie that contains no paid-for product placements
and where any trademark use in the film is minimal and incidental, this
First Amendment protection for motion pictures remains unchallenged.
The question presented here is whether product placement has
sufficiently transformed movies into commercial speech, therefore
stripping motion pictures of constitutional and statutory protection, and
forcing filmmakers to solicit permission from mark owners before using
those marks. Under current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, any speech
that does more than propose a commercial transaction is
"noncommercial. 245 A movie, because it does not propose a commercial
transaction, falls squarely into the definition of noncommercial speech
and will be deemed fully protected, artistic expression under the
Supreme Court's current framework.246 As of now, filmmakers need not
seek and receive permission from trademark owners before displaying
trademarks.247
Despite this current result regarding commercial speech doctrine and
movies, films that feature extensive product placement and advertising
tie-ins cause intuitive discomfort with this standard. Once a filmmaker
accepts payment or other compensation to place a specific product in a
film, those choices arguably are no longer purely artistic. Extended focus
on a can of Pepsi or the showcasing of an Apple laptop computer, for
example, are directorial decisions occasioned by the movie studios'
direct financial stake in the presentation of those products. Thus, in a
ninety- to 120-minute movie, the viewer may be subjected to upwards of
twenty paid "advertisements. 248 As such, certain motion pictures could
244. Id. at 502-03.
245. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85
(1973).
246. See id.; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
247. See discussion infra Part IV.A., and notes 250-257 and accompanying text, explaining, in
greater detail, the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine as it applies to expressive works.
See also Snyder, supra note 238, at 325.
248. See Alex J. Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
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be seen as lengthy, multi-product commercials, just as many television
commercials are actually short "films" which showcase a product.
249
Despite this continuing trend towards greater product placement, U.S.
Supreme Court precedent allows films to retain their status as
noncommercial speech.250 Two Supreme Court decisions, Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.251 and Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox,252  indicate that the
commercial/noncommercial nature of speech is determined by
evaluating the "primary purpose" of speech, which in turn is derived
from considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
speech itself, the speaker, and the audience.253 Unlike the case with
product placement in movies, the retailers in Fox and Bolger were
adding nonessential, noncommercial speech in hopes of converting their
speech to noncommercial speech. Such a fagade, the Court noted, was
just as ineffective as attempting to convert a sales presentation into
religious or political speech by convening it with a prayer or the Pledge
of Allegiance.254 The Court seemed bothered in both cases by the
REv. 627, 640 n.54 (1990).
249. Id. (pointing out that a popular Pepsi commercial featuring Michael J. Fox never expressly
sold the product, instead focusing on the actor's comically strenuous efforts to please his new
neighbor). Other examples of such marketing include the Nike "I'm Tiger Woods" commercials that
arguably make political statements about race and sports, rather than expressly promoting products.
250. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
251. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
252. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
253. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 474-77; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-68. In Bolger, the Supreme Court
clarified that neither the fact that speech is in the form of an advertisement, nor that the speech
references a specific product, nor that the speaker has economic motivation for the speech, is an
independently sufficient ground to classify speech as commercial. 463 U.S. at 66-67. In Bolger, the
totality of facts, combined with the Court's view that the advertisements' comments on public
health and family planning were only tenuously linked to the economic aspects of the defendants'
flyers, led to the conclusion that the speech was commercial. Id. at 66-68. Despite concluding that
the speech was commercial, the Court nevertheless declared the law prohibiting the mailing of the
defendants' flyers unconstitutional. Id. at 74-75. Building upon this line of reasoning, the Court in
Fox considered whether Tupperware parties that presented retail goods with concurrent discussion
of home economics amounted to commercial speech. 492 U.S. at 472. Again, the Court concluded
that inclusion of noncommercial, educational elements could not transform the Tupperware parties,
which essentially proposed a commercial transaction for the goods exhibited by defendant, into
noncommercial speech. Id. at 471-75. The Court ruled, however, that the First Amendment issue
was not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 484.
254. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 474 ("No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell
housewares without teaching home economics .... Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker
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defendants' attempts to "immunize" their commercial speech fromjudicial scrutiny by supplementing it with related noncommercial
speech.255
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's primary-purpose analysis, motion
pictures with product placements are noncommercial speech.256 Unlike
Bolger and Fox, movies are primarily and overwhelmingly
noncommercial expressions with commercial elements sprinkled
throughout their artistic message. 7 Subjecting a James Bond film to the
rubric of Bolger and Fox yields the result that the movie is
noncommercial: the primary purpose of the movie is to communicate an
expressive message, which could have been relayed without placing a
specific brand of sports car in the movie. Further, considering the totality
of factors, the filmmaker's primary motivation in creating the movie is
to sell the movie as an artistic product, not to create sales of the featured
products. If the filmmaker's artistic vision calls for a character to drink a
soda or use a computer, the choice of which soda or which computer
manufacturer is completely incidental to the vision. The fact that the
movie studio receives money from a particular soda or computer
manufacturer is also arguably incidental to the primarily noncommercial
speech. Thus, despite the increasing prevalence of product placements,
currently, it would appear that movies still retain "noncommercial"
categorization under the U.S. Supreme Court's current commercial
speech rubric.
B. Pushing the Definitional Bounds of Noncommercial Speech
How far this categorization will be extended in the future, however, is
a matter of some uncertainty. Two judges, criticizing the results reached
by courts considering commercial speech questions, have noted that the
line between commercial and noncommercial speech is not easy to
discern.258 Nowhere are the limitations of this strict dichotomy more
from conveying, or the audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the
nature of things requires them to be combined with commercial messages.").
255. See id.; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (discussing the inclusion of healthcare facts in a drug store
flyer, which was also used as an advertisement and stating "[a]dvertisers should not be permitted to
immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply by including
references to public issues.").
256. See Snyder, supra note 238, at 325 (arguing that under Bolger, a film containing product
placements is not commercial speech).
257. Id. at 326-27.
258. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
936
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evident than in the context of motion picture product placements. I
present below six product-placement scenarios that, when considered
under the commercial/noncommercial speech polarity, suggest that the
"commerciality" of speech might better be understood as a spectrum or
sliding scale. As I illustrate, if commerciality were a sliding scale, the
latter scenarios would fall on the commercial side. The hypothetical
scenarios are as follows:
(1) a filmmaker needs a particular type of product in his movie (car,
computer, etc.) and makes a wholly value-neutral decision as to which
particular brand of product to use;
(2) a filmmaker chooses certain trademarks to appear in the movie
based on consumer survey data indicating greater appeal of certain
trademarks over others in order to increase movie revenues;
(3) a filmmaker simply dislikes a particular brand or trademarked
product and chooses to portray that product in a negative light as an
attempt to harm the product or corporation represented by the trademark;
(4) a filmmaker routinely pays a product placement agency to review
all scripts so that the agency can suggest alterations and additions
resulting in product placement revenue;
(5) a filmmaker charges a "non-placement fee" on non-discriminatory
terms to all manufacturers of a product, so that manufacturers can pay to
opt out of negative portrayals; and
(6) a filmmaker accepts payment from a manufacturer to portray a
competitor-manufacturer's product in a negative or disparaging light.
Of these possibilities, scenarios (1) and (2) present the fewest
problems for the commercial speech doctrine. Although a trademark
owner may be upset that its trademarked car was chosen for a bank
robbery or its computer used to inject a virus into government
computers, it has very little recourse against the filmmaker. The film is
an expressive work and would be deemed noncommercial. The
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be
entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line between the commercial and noncommercial has
not merely blurred; it has disappeared."); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 279 (Cal. 2002)
(Brown, J., dissenting) ("In today's world, the difference between commercial and noncommercial
speech is not black and white. Due to the growing politicization of commercial matters and
increased sophistication of advertising campaigns, the intersection between commercial and
noncommercial speech has become larger and larger. As this gray area expands, continued
adherence to the dichotomous, all-or-nothing approach developed by the United States Supreme
Court will eventually lead us down one of two unappealing paths: either the voices of businesses in
the public debate will be effectively silenced, or businesses will be able to dupe consumers with
impunity."), cert. dismissed, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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filmmaker does not directly profit from the use or degradation of the
plaintiffs trademark, and use of the mark is incidental to the artistic
vision. In the second scenario, although the choice of which trademark
product to display is based on consumer survey data, the choice is not
directly motivated by profit. The filmmaker may receive a better or
worse commercial response to his film based on the subtle incorporation
of consumer attitudes, but such effect is tangential to the artistic vision.
Virtually all artists seek some degree of traction with consumers,259 so
perhaps the filmmaker's scientific approach to that end should be no
cause for alarm.
The third scenario presents a troubling issue because the filmmaker's
choice of trademarked product is not value-neutral. It is not simply
necessity and happenstance that drives this product choice-a Ford
sedan is chosen specifically because the filmmaker bears rational or
irrational dislike towards the company. Because the filmmaker again
derives no direct revenue from the use of the product, arguably scenario
(3) attains the same result as scenarios (1) and (2). Nevertheless, this
scenario raises the question whether, for purposes of commercial speech
classification and trademark liability, the defendant's motive matters. If
so, what types of motives matter? Perhaps irrational hatred should matter
for a defamation claim, 260 but not for the purposes of classifying
commercial speech and attaining trademark liability.
In the fourth scenario, a marketing or advertising agency conducts a
preliminary review of movie scripts to discover product placement
opportunities. Because the scripts are already written before the
alterations for product placements are introduced, arguably the artistic
message is primary and the commercial aspects only tangential.
Assuming a product placement agency's edits are cosmetic and not
substantive, the argument is even stronger that the commercially-
oriented aspects of the speech are merely minor additives, incapable of
transforming noncommercial speech into commercial speech. On the
other hand, the artistic product in scenario (4) is clearly altered by a
direct profit motive which differentiates it from scenarios (1), (2), and
259. See White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority talks of the
'difference between fun and profit,' but in the entertainment industry fun is profit.") (emphasis and
internal citations omitted).
260. See Mary F. Prechtel, Comment, Classical Malice: A New Fault Standard for Defamation in
Fiction, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 202-14 (1994) (arguing that current defamation laws are
inappropriate when applied to works of fiction, but that a classical malice standard might be
appropriate).
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(3).
The fifth and sixth scenarios present the thorniest issues for
categorizing movies as noncommercial or commercial speech. In both
scenarios, the economic motivation to disparage or negatively portray a
particular trademarked product is evident. Accepting payment for non-
placement or for placement of a competing trademark may tip the scale
more in favor of a finding of commercial speech. Under the Bolger
test,261 the identity of the speaker and the economic motivation for the
speech are factors in the totality of circumstances analysis.
Ultimately, the bulk of speech in both scenarios (5) and (6) remains
noncommercial, but the commercial aspects of speech in both situations
are more prominent and discernible than in scenarios (1) through (4).
Scenario (5), as with scenario (4), offers filmmakers the direct
opportunity to profit from exclusion of certain trademarked products,
even when they do not profit from the product that actually appears on
screen. To the extent the commercial speech doctrine will reflect a
continuum in the future, the speech in scenario (5) appears to be
significantly more "commercial" than the previous examples.
Finally, in scenario (6) a manufacturer pays the filmmaker to have a
competitor's product negatively portrayed. Here, it appears that the
speech and unauthorized trademark use has crossed the threshold into
commercial speech, like that of the defendants in Bolger and Fox. The
mark owner's strongest claim is based on the identity of speaker: the
speaker in scenario (6) is actually a market competitor and not the
filmmaker. The claim would be based on the notion that a competitor
cannot use the filmmaker and the artistic medium to gain a commercial
advantage that it could not accomplish without the middleperson and the
medium. Given courts' hostility to trademark defilement by a
competitor,262 they are unlikely to immunize the speech by declaring it
noncommercial under these facts.
If it is true, as this Article argues, that trademark laws do not protect a
trademark owner's product from being disparaged or ridiculed in a
movie, then the background regime is one of near-complete artistic
autonomy for the filmmaker with concomitant uncertainty for the
trademark owner. Against this backdrop, a trademark owner may choose
261. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983).
262. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
defendant liable for alteration of plaintiff's trademark in a commercial advertisement); cf Hormel
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that competitive
status is an important factor in trademark analysis).
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to opt out of the uncertainty by paying a fee to ensure that its product
will not be negatively portrayed as part of the film's expressive message.
Thus, any conflict arising out of the portrayal at that point would sound
in contract law, not in trademark or competition law.
The purpose of this Article is not to provide definitive answers to, or a
complete analysis of, the question of whether these scenarios would be
classified as commercial or noncommercial speech. Rather, these
examples highlight some of the issues that courts and litigants may
encounter as unauthorized trademark use increases in expressive works
and the commercial aspects of those uses become more apparent. In
addition, they showcase the difficulty caused by conceiving of
commerciality as an easily cleaved duality.
In sum, a motion picture is still primarily an artistic endeavor, albeit
one with huge commercial promise and impact for the featured
trademarked products. Along the spectrum from scenarios (1) to (6),
filmmakers, and by extension other artists, will force reconsideration of
the Court's commercial speech doctrine. Any redefinition of commercial
speech that expands its parameters will push the boundary between
trademark and free expression towards private concerns.
C. Increasing the Likelihood of Confusion
While the significance of the noncommercial/commercial distinction
is apparent in determining the boundary between trademark law and the
First Amendment in the dilution context, it is more attenuated in the
confusion context. Even if product placements do not transform films
into commercial speech subject to dilution liability, the increasing
presence of product placements may facilitate the ability to establish the
likelihood of confusion necessary to claim infringement. The movie-
going consumer is now well aware that James Bond may drive an Aston
Martin or a BMW, or that Neo, Morpheus, and Trinity of The Matrix use
a particular cellular phone.263 When viewers are aware that many of the
products they see on screen appear pursuant to a marketing contract,
they may be more likely to assume that all trademarked products
appearing on screen are similarly placed pursuant to lucrative deals.
Based on this "audience expectation" rationale, litigants have
263. See, e.g., A Chronological History of the James Bond Film Vehicles, CAR ENTHUSIAST,
http://www.carenthusiast.com/news091O/bond_3.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005) (chronicling James
Bonds' history of vehicles); Samsung Pays $100mm for Product Placement in Matrix Sequels,
http://www.mediathinking.com/more/A370_l_0_M/ (May 12, 2003, 10:58 EST).
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(unsuccessfully) argued that unauthorized use in a movie caused
confusion as to the mark owner's affiliation with, endorsement, or
sponsorship of the movie. 26
Despite unfavorable treatment of such claims in recent litigation, the
"audience expectation" does correlate with the "consumer
sophistication" factor assessed in the balancing test's confusion
metric.26' Although such expectations would not alone overcome free
expression concerns, the calcification of viewer expectation will likely
make it more difficult for filmmakers to counter infringement suits.
CONCLUSION
Unauthorized use of trademarks in expressive works has fomented
significant controversy between mark owners asserting rights under
federal trademark law and defendants claiming protection under the First
Amendment. Filmmakers, singers, painters, parodists, and authors
increasingly reference trademarks as a method of effectively
communicating with audiences and succinctly expressing their thoughts
about popular, commercial culture. As trademarks in our popular culture
have evolved into shorthand symbols for values, ideas, and experiences,
they no longer fall within the exclusive domain of the trademark holder.
Rather, when used as part of an artistic work, trademarks become the
legitimate subject of a parodist's humor or a filmmaker's cinematic
vision. As Judge Kozinski stated, "the trademark owner does not have
the right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his




The proper boundary between trademark law and free expression
prevents trademark owners from dictating the appearance or usage of
their trademarks in the noncommercial sphere. Perhaps in the future the
definition of that sphere will change, causing a concomitant redefinition
264. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922-23 (C.D. I11. 2003)
(denying plaintiff manufacturer's motion for a temporary restraining order against defendant
filmmaker for an allegedly dilutive use of plaintiff's trademarked bulldozers in defendant's movie).
This argument was advanced by the plaintiff to no avail; the court's order denying the temporary
restraining order disregarded it completely. Id. at 918; see also Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 03-CV1334 at 7 (C.D. I11 2003 ) (on file
with author).
265. See supra Part III (discussing specific factors within the multi-factored likelihood-of-
confusion test that feature more prominently when the alleged infringement occurs in an expressive
work).
266. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
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of the boundary of trademark law. For now, however, artists may
continue to create, secure in the knowledge that in the sequel, Speech-
Zilla defeats Trademark Kong.267
267. See id. at 898 ("If this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might be called Speech-Zilla meets
Trademark Kong.").
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